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FOUR YEARS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
By CHARLES BERTRAND BAYLY, JR.*
A SURVEY of the cases and orders handed down during the last
four and one-half years under the Robinson-Patman Act
of 1936 cannot begin without a word concerning its forerunner-
the Clayton Anti-trust Act of 1914. Section 2 of the Clayton Act,'
specifically directed against discrimination "in price between dif-
ferent purchasers of commodities," was primarily designed to
prevent in the seller's line of business monopolies, brought about
by local price cutting to the injury of a competitor in the same
community. But, as large scale methods of distribution through
chain stores, department stores, and mail-order houses increased
in power, a greater danger of injury to competition, injury in the
buyer's line of commerce, arose and created the potentiality of
monopoly therein. To meet this new problem the Clayton Act
was finally applied in 1929 to a situation where the price dis-
crimination substantially lessened competition between buyers. 2
Another obstacle in preserving the old independent wholesaler and
retailer by means of the Clayton Act, however, presented itself
when the sixth circuit court of appeals ultimately held that the
proviso in the Act, permitting a price discrimination "on account
of differences in ... quantity ... . or that makes only due allow-
ance for differences in the cost of selling or transportation .... .
rendered legal a large price differential based upon a much smaller
*Instructor, College of Law, Ohio State University.
1(1914) 38 Stat. at L. 730, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 13, 15 F. C. A. sec. 13.
McAllister, Sales Policies and Price Discrimination Under the Clayton
Act, (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 518, 519; H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess., p. 8.2George Van Camp & Sons Company v. American Can Co., (1929)
278 U. S. 245, 49 Sup. Ct. 112, 73 L. Ed. 311, 60 A. L. R. 1060; Note,(1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 680; American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co.,
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 763, cert. denied, (1931) 282 U. S. 899,
51 Sup. Ct. 183, 75 L. Ed. 792; (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 867.
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cost saving arising from the quantities purchased.' Thus a dis-
count given on account of quantity purchased opened the way to
limitless price discrimination in favor of a large mass distributor
to the detriment of the smaller old-line wholesalers, retailers, and
those manufacturers dependent on them for distribution. But
apprehensive of the forthcoming result in this decision, and de-
siring to strengthen for the better protection of the independent
wholesalers and retailers against those large scale distributors,
already fast growing in number and size, the prohibitions against
price discrimination, especially that brought by indirect means,
Congress had already passed in June of 1936 the Robinson-
Patman Act, of which sec. 1,4 taking the place of sec. 2 of the old
Clayton Act, is the most important of its four sections.
PRICE
The Act forbids "any person. . . , to discriminate in price...
Although not expressly defined, by implication "price" seems to
mean the net amount the buyer pays after deduction of all dis-
counts and allowances. 5 Since the net amount which the buyer
must pay is the important factor in order to compare such amount
with what another buyer must pay under similar circumstances,
3Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 620, cert. denied, (1939) 308 U. S. 557, 60
Sup. Ct. 74, 84 L. Ed. 468; (1939) 17 Tex. L. Rev. 517; (1939) 11
Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 259.
4(1936) 49 Stat. at L. 1526, 15 U. S. C. sec. 13, Supp. 1939. Section 2
of the Clayton Act now has five subsections, (a) through (f). Through-
out the article the provisions of the amendments will be referred to as
sec. 2 and not sec. 1. Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act itself is a
provision of temporary significance, enacted to allow the then pending
(June 19, 1936) Goodyear litigation to be reopened to assert a violation of
the amended Clayton Act, yet at the same time to preserve the record
and order in the case prosecuted under the old sec. 2. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1937) 92 F.(2d) 677, rev'd on other grounds, (1938) 304 U. S. 257, 58 Sup. Ct. 863,
82 L. Ed. 1326. Very early much was written about the new Act.
Legislation, (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 106; (1937) 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 306;
Note, (1937) 46 Yale L. J. 447; Legislation, (1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 1285;
Robertson, The Robinson-Patman Act, (1936) 14 Fortune 96; Wheeler,
Comments on the Robinson-Patman Act, (1938) 12 Conn. B. J. 171;
Gallagher, Federal Price Fixing Laws and Decisions on Regulation of
Business, (1938) 3 John Marshall L. Q. 230; Legislation, (1936) 24 Geo.
L. J. 951 (legislative history); (1937) 23 Va. L. Rev. 201, 316.
5See Zorn and Feldman, Business Under the New Price Laws (1937)
74-75; Evans, Anti-Price Discrimination Act of 1936, (1937) 23 Va. L.
Rev. 140, 160 (price is amount paid by buyer, not amount realized by
seller) ; cf. In the Matter of United States Rubber Company, (1939) 28
F. T. C. 1489 ("net realized price" defined in cease and desist order as
net amount of money paid by purchaser taking into account discounts and
all other price adjustments). But see commission's definition in In the
Matter of United Fence Manufacturers Association, (1938) 27 F. T. C. 377.
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thus revealing any discrimination, this definition would seem to
follow from the statutory wording itself.
DIFFERENT PURCHASERS
Two purchasers must be involved to make possible a com-
parison to ascertain whether even a price difference between
them actually does exist. Thus the price discrimination must be
"between different purchasers," meaning, not one who wishes to
buy, a prospective buyer, but one to whom an executed sale already
has been made. Thus in Shww's v. Wilson-Jones Co.,6 the fact
that the defendant had supplied the plaintiff in the past and had
promised to quote prices on the particular supplies to fulfill the
contract for which plaintiff was going to bid did not make the
plaintiff a purchaser within the meaning of the Act. A past cus-
tomer is not a present one. However, the plaintiff might well
have been by reason of past dealings a customer within the
words, ". . . competition with any person who . . .grants or...
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of
either of them." But "customer" seems to mean, as applied to
such a case, the successful bidder-an actual purchaser-who
did buy the supplies of defendant, since competition with him was
6Shaw's v. Wilson-Jones Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 331;
Note, (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 157. The court's view in this case is
sustainable as an interpretation of the Act by reason of several indications
therein. Section 2 (a) reads "... , where either or any of the pur-
chases involved in such discrimination are in commerce .. " "Purchases,"
referring back to "purchasers," seems to contemplate sales so that the
goods may be said to have been placed in the current of commerce. 'Mere
price quotations not appearing to be commerce, Congress would have no
power to regulate such activity. But in the case decided, since an
interstate sale was made by defendant to plaintiff's successfully bidding
competitor to the injury of plaintiff, the words "where either .. . of the
purchases involved . .. are in commerce" would give Congress power to
regulate such interstate purchase made to the injury of plaintiff, as to
whom no interstate commerce existed. (See p. 139 infra.) But the Act
further reads "... , where such commodities are sold .... " referring
back to "different purchasers of commodities." "Sold" contemplates the
existence of actual sales and purchases to be compared. See In the Matter
of Bird & Son, (1937) 25 F. T. C. 548, 553 ("Not until there is a
discrimination in price among those chosen does sec. 2 (a) of the act
have any application.") ; cf. Abouaf v. J. D. & A. B. Spreckels Co.,
(N.D. Cal. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 830. But cf. Letter from W. A. Ayres,
Chairman of Federal Trade Commission, to Hon. Wright Patman with
informal opinions of commission in 64 cases under Robinson-Patman Act,
July 23, 1937. 81 Cong. Rec. 12456 (1937), No. 20, 2 C. C. H. Trade
Reg. Serv. (8th ed) Par. 9170.20 (bid to U. S. Army at higher price
than other sales). The same requirement was applied under the old Act.
Cf. Lipson v. Socony-Vacuum Corp. (D. Mass. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 961;
(1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 127, aff'd, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 213;
Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation, (D. Md. 1938) 26 F. Supp.
824.
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interfered with. His competitor-plaintiff-was injured, when
plaintiff was not awarded the bid and he, as the successful bidder,
himself was a purchaser. Thus "customers" seem here to be
used synonymously with "purchasers."
Had defendant in this case quoted plaintiff one set of prices
and the successful bidder another, a more difficult problem would
have been raised. Here again only one purchase would have
existed, but two sets of prices to be compared. Only a slight, if
any, difference in the effect on competition results between the
situations where the unfavored buyer takes the goods at the higher
prices, but does not make any, or as much, profit on resale as the
favored buyer who acquires his goods at the lower price, and
where the unfavored buyer does not buy at all, because he realizes
that he cannot compete with such a favored buyer. Quoting hvo
sets of prices does not seem to indicate bona fide customer selec-
tion and refusal to sell,ea but on the contrary willingness to sell to
the unfavored buyer at the higher price. Although this situation
is, however, probably excluded from sec. 2 (a) by its wording,
as pointed out in the Shaw's Case, yet it falls within the policy of
the Act. In such a restriction in the scope of the Act by thus
requiring two actual purchasers as a basis to find a discrimination
in price7 Congress may be justified, both because it is so difficult to
draw a sharp line between bona fide and discriminatory, unreason-
able refusals to sell, whether by refusal to quote any price or by
quoting higher, prohibitory prices, and because a possible remedy
exists in other parts of the anti-trust laws.
DISCRIMINATION
Discrimination, it has been said, involves something more than
a mere differential or variation in price. It involves such a rela-
tionship, as that of competition, between customers of a seller
that they are entitled to equal treatment in price.8 But the word-
6aSee p. 167 infra.
7The district court had taken the view that refusal to sell at any
price was a price discrimination, there being no other reason for such
refusal, but held that refusal to quote prices was not the same as refusal
to sell. This construction of the pleading seems unduly strict. Ordinarily
a refusal to quote prices does indicate a refusal to sell, unless there is a
possibility of price fluctuation between the time of quotation and sale.
Shaw's v. Wilson-Jones Co., (E.D. Pa. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 713. See (1940)
40 Col. L. Rev. 157, 159, note 10. A refusal to sell at a dealer's discount
is not a price discrimination between purchasers. Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix
Cheese Corp., (D. Md. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 824 (under old Act) semble.
8See Representative Utterback in (1936) 80 Cong. Reg. 9559; Gaskill,
What You May and May Not Do Under the New Price Discrimination Law
-Robinson-Patman Law (1936) 20. But see McAllister, Price Control by
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ing of sec. 2 (a) seems equally consistent with the notion that a
price discrimination is merely a price difference. Further to find
such a difference illegal all of the additional elements enumerated
therein must be found, and no justification under any of the
provisos proved. But, except in clear cases,9 whether a price
discrimination exists is often confused with the question of
whether it is illegal. Although which "label" is used would seem
to make no difference in the ultimate result, "discrimination" might
well be reserved to describe a price difference after all of the
elements enumerated in sec. 2 (a) have been proved. The ques-
tion of its illegality then would not arise unless none of the justifi-
cations for such price discrimination in the provisos of sec. 2 (a)
and (b) were proved.
Although a buyer can discriminate in favor of sellers by offer-
ing to buy at different prices, this is a more unusual situation, and
is not proscribed by the Act.10
CoMMODITIES
The Act does not operate unless "different purchasers of corn-
modities" are involved. What are commodities? Generally
tangible personal property is meant. Since the same wording
appeared in the old sec. 2, decisions under the Clayton Act are
here in point. Thus the transportation of passengers by bus is not
a commodity within that section," the distinction arising between
tangible goods and services. 12  By inference In the Matter of
Law in the United States: A Survey, (1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob.
273, 291 (any difference is discrimination in price).
OSee In the Matter of Standard Brands Incorporated, (1939) 29
F. T. C. 121 (price schedule based on monthly requirements, not actual
purchases, and not adhered to anyway) ; In the Matter of Simmons Co.,(1939) 29 F. T. C. 727 (discount depended on number of other units in
central buying organization); In the Matter of Nutrine Candy Company,
Docket No. 3756 (F.T.C. Dec. 19, 1939) (seller's salesmen permitted to
classify purchasers in different price schedules on each order and separate
items in same order) ; In the Matter of Curtice Brothers Co., Docket No.
3381 (F.T.C. April 15. 1940): In the Matter of Anheuser-Busch Inc..
Docket No. 2987 (F.T.C. May 11, 1940). In so far as discounts based upon
monthly requirements, not actual purchases, cause discrimination, as "off-
scale" or lower price to one buying all his requirements from the seller, as
in the Anheuser Busch Case would tend to abolish this discrimination.1
'Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, No. 47. But cf. subsection
(c) covering the reverse case-illegal brokerage payments by a buyer
to seller. See p. 174 infra.
"Fleetway v. Public Service Interstate Transportation Co., (C.C.A.
3d Cir. 1934), 72 F. (2d) 761, cert. denied, (1935) 293 U. S. 626, 55 Sup.
Ct. 347, 79 L. Ed. 713; (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1566; see also In the
Matter of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, (1936) 22 F. T. C. 232
(Tires commodities within sec. 2 of Clayton Act).
12Since the same distinction is usually made in deciding what transac-
tions are taxable under a state or city sales tax, cases thereunder are
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Christmas Club'3 shows what is the nature of "commodities."
There respondent was engaged in the sale of pass books, account
books, advertising literature, and other paraphernalia, called
"systems," for use by banks and trust companies in the conduct
of Christmas Clubs and other savings plans for their depositors.
The commission, while not discussing the question whether these
"systems" were "commodities," found a violation of sec. 2 (a).
The pass books, literature, etc., were tangible, but alone had little
value except as they enabled the purchasing banks and trust com-
panies to set up a savings plan. The idea involved was the im-
portant thing. Respondent in telling its customers how to
inaugurate the "system" seemed to be rendering a service. If
the ideas had been conveyed orally or by letters, "commodities"
would not have been involved at all. Yet this situation is
analogous to those illustrating the extended scope of application
of retail sales taxes. The books and literature which changed
hands, furthermore, were themselves tangible personal property,
usable as such by consumers. Informally the commission has de-
cided that the sale of advertising space is not the sale of "com-
modities" within the meaning of the Act.' 4 But the fact that the
sale of services is not within the Act offers a means of its avoid-
ance in the form of a conversion contract or bailment, where the
distributor provides the raw materials and hires the manufacturer
to process them for him into the finished product.15
OF LIKE GRADE AND QUALITY
The Act forbids price discrimination "between different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality." 10 But such
differences, to justify varying price discounts, must be substantial.
Otherwise a slight change in grade or quality of the product sold
analogous. State Tax Commission v. Hopkins, (1937) 234 Ala. 556, 176
So. 210; Note (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 753.
13(1937) 25 F. T. C. 1116; cf. In the Matter of the Williams and
Wilkins Co., (1939) 29 F. T. C. 678 (medical and scientific books).
14 Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, No. 9.
15 Thorp and George, Check List of Possible Effects of the Robinson-
Patman Act (1936) reprinted with additions from Dun & Bradstreet
Monthly Review, August, 1936 issue.
'
6 The Clayton Act made price discriminations illegal unless com-
modities of different grade or quality were involved. The Robinson-
Patman Act makes illegal the price discrimination only if the commodities
are of like grade and quality. Although the wording is different, the result
in the two acts seems to be the same. Cf. Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove
Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 768, cert. denied (1934) 293 U. S.
590, 55 Sup. Ct. 104, 79 L. Ed. 684 (mittens and gloves under Clayton
Act).
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to the favored buyer could be made the basis of a large price dis-
crimination for his benefit.' 7  Even assuming that a substantial
difference exists, should the price difference be related to and
limited by the cost differences in the manufacture, sale, or delivery
between the two grades or qualities? The cost accounting prob-
lem involved in limiting the price differential to the actual cost
differences of making, selling, or delivering the goods of these
differing grades or qualities would become so difficult that
Congress omitted such a requirement from the statute. For this
reason minor grade and quality variations should be disregarded
in testing the legality of a price differential. Furthermore, price
discrimination, which affects most adversely competition in the
field of distribution, arises in the large scale manufacture and
distribution of standardized commodities, where quality and grade
classifications are fewer and more pronounced. Where products
are less standardized, many slight variations of grade and quality
could lead to price discrimination.
But in In the Matter of Christmas Club' s the savings club plan
"systems" were found to be of "like grade and quality." Although
the point was not raised, the nearer these "systems" partook of the
nature of services, the more difficult would have become the problem
of finding them "of like grade and quality," for each bank or
trust company might -well have presented a different problem in
inaugurating a workable, satisfactory savings or Christmas Club
plan. However, in most of the sales in that case differences prob-
ably would not have been substantial enough to justify the price
variations there found.
A common problem arising under this clause involves the use
of private brands on goods purchased. Thus in In the Matter of
the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company,' although Sears, Roebuck
& Company had its own private brand-"All State"-for tires
made especially for it by respondent, the commission found no
substantial difference between that tire and those sold to re-
spondent's independent tire distributors. But ladies' handbags
purchased by a large chain store at a five to seven per cent better
discount over other buyers were found not to be of the same
17See Gallagher, The Robinson-Patman Act, (1937) 2 John Marshall
L. Q. 464, 476-7.
28(1937) 25 F. T. C. 1116.
10(1936) 22 F. T. C. 232 (grade and size of tires comparable).
Although this case arose under the old Clayton Act, many points in it
arise under the new Act. In the Matter of United States Rubber Com-
pany, (1938) 28 F. T. C. 1489 (special brand tires sold through chain
stores and auto supply companies).
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grade or quality as those sold to such unfavored customers,
because these handbags were designed to match shoes sold by that
chain store, and further carried its private brand.20  The com-
mission was rather liberal here in justifying such a large price
concession by finding substantial differences in grade and quality,
for the greater the price differential, the more clearly should such
grade and quality distinctions stand out. But a private brand
alone will not make the commodity of different grade and quality.
Thus In the Matter of Hansen Inoculator Company,2' involved
the situation of one dealer-jobber paying ten cents less per bushel
than other buyers for bacteria cultures (an inoculant), but affixing
his own private brand thereon for resale to his customers. The
inoculant was found to be the same as that sold to all others, the
finding being reinforced by the fact that even the private trade-
mark closely resembled that of the manufacturer-seller-respondent.
On the other hand, in so far as a nationally known brand has
developed a definite consumer demand, the fact that the identical
commodity with a private brand sells for less will not affect sales
of the more expensive standard brand. This competitive test
would lead to the conclusion that these goods with such a private
trademark are not "like" commodities. The suggestion is made
that the complexities of application of this test preclude its
adoption.22  But in so far as price differentials cannot affect
consumer demand because of belief, arising from differing brands,
of grade and quality differences or because of desire for the
national brand anyway, the harmful effect on competition re-
quired to be found by the Act cannot result. The two com-
modities do not compete. Conversely, goods extrinsically and
intrinsically different may so exactly fulfill the same needs that
consumers are influenced in buying the one or the other merely
because of price differences.
Whether price is the sole or substantial motivating factor in
controlling consumer demand seems to have been the test so far
applied, even though unconsciously. Thus because of lower
price, potential Goodyear tire purchasers switched to "All State,"
while the lower price in the handbag case had no effect on any
20Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, No. 31; cf. No. 17 (mLxed
grade and quality orders) ; No. 38 (hats different in style, size, trimming,dyes).2d(1938) 26 F. T. C. 303. Cf. In the Matter of the Nitragin Com-
pany, Inc., (1938) 26 F. T. C. 320.22See Zorn and Feldman, Business Under the New Price Laws (1937)
77-78.
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consumer demand not originally wanting to match with handbags
shoes purchased from the favored buyer nor desiring that store's
private label on such bags. But such a test does not clearly
delineate the additional elements of an illegal price discrimina-
tion-particularly whether the required injury to competition
exists with the price differential as its proximate cause. For this
reason the simpler test of physical identity may be preferable
in determining "like grade and quality. '23  Then if consumer
demand continues to differentiate between the private and the
standard brand, no appreciable effect on competition will be
found. The ultimate result in either case will be the same.
COMMERCE
Like the Clayton Act, the amended sec. 2 (a) requires that the
grantor of the price discrimination be "engaged in commerce. '24
The price discrimination must occur "in the course of such com-
merce." But unlike the original, the amended sec. 2 (a) further
adds, "where either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are in commerce." All of these requirements as
to the finding of "commerce" would seem to be satisfied if one
of the two purchases to be compared is an interstate sale; i.e.,
where the buyer is in another state and goods are ordered and
shipped across a state line to him. If such a sale discriminates
in favor of or against such buyer, it could be said to be "in the
course of such commerce." But if such a sale were the only
interstate sale made by the seller charged, it would be more
difficult to call such seller "engaged in commerce." This problem
may be confused with that of whether one act of discrimination
alone has the necessary harmful effect on competition, but should
be kept separate. The Clayton Act requires both purchases to be
in interstate commerce, or substantially to affect it. The theory in
the amendment is that Congress can prevent a price discrimination
in favor of an extra-state buyer from injuring a local competitor
or local competition because of its power to prevent the direct
use of interstate commerce to accomplish a harmful object, and
can further prevent a price discrimination in favor of a local
buyer from injuring an extra-state competitor or competition be-
2:*See Smith. The Patman Act in Practice, (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev.
705, 721-24 (test should be that of a sophisticated judge). In determining
similarity of grade and quality, should the container be considered part of
the commodity, especially if inseparable therefrom? See p. 184 infra.
2ASince the Robinson-Patman Act takes the place of sec. 2 of the
Clayton Act, the definitions of the latter apply to the former. Thus the
old definition of "commerce" still applies.
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cause of its power to prevent local activities from directly bur-
dening the flow of interstate commerce.2 5
Although this theory be constitutional, nevertheless the prob-
lem of when a purchase is in commerce, required of at least one
of the purchases involved, still remains. To this problem all of
the precedents on what is in interstate commerce are applic-
able .2  But it is not essential that the purchaser or his customer
who receives the advantage or disadvantage of the price dis-
crimination be in commerce himself. He need do business only
locally.27  For the protection of such small local retailers and
wholesalers the Act was designed. Mindful of its own power,
the commission has dismissed several cases, because the purchases
have neither been in nor have involved interstate commerce.2 8
2 5Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936) 4-5; H. R. Rep.
No. 2287, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936) 8; see In the Matter of National
Numbering Machine Company, Inc., Docket No. 3889 (F.T.C. December
19, 1939). "In any line of commerce" seems to be a requirement that the
injured buyer himself also be engaged in interstate commerce. Cf. Port
v. Girdler, (N.Y. Co. Sup. Ct. Nov. 10, 1939) 1 P. H. Trade Serv. (2d
ed.) par. 40,529 (though seller engaged in interstate commerce, transac-
tions complained of must also be in interstate commerce). See McLaughlin,
The Courts and the Robinson-Patman Act: Possibilities of Strict Con-
struction, (1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 410, 414 (new Act more
restrictive than Clayton Act, because former requires one sale at least to
be in interstate commerce, while "in the course of such commerce" in the
latter requires two only local sales which directly and substantially affect
interstate commerce). American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co.,
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 763 cert. denied (1931) 282 U. S. 899, 51
Sup. Ct. 183, 75 L. Ed. 792 (sales to favored, local buyers held in course
of interstate commerce because of resales in interstate commerce), (1931)
44 Harv. L. Rev. 867. But cf. Bunte Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission,
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 412, (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1205
(under F.T.C. Act).2 6Cf. Alabama Independent Service Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum
Corporation, (N.D. Ala. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 386 (sales from local storage
tanks still in interstate commerce, tanks being mere conduits through which
flowed subjects of interstate commerce), with Lipson v. Socony Vacuum
Corporation, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1937) 87 F. (2d) 265, cert. granted, (1937)
300 U. S. 651, 57 Sup. Ct. 612, dismissed per stipulation, (1937) 301 U. S.
711 (anticipated demands of customers without specific contract for
gasoline, brought into state and locally stored, held not to cause interstate
commerce to continue till deliveries made to buyers) ; cf. In the Matter of
Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation, (1937) 25 F. T. C. 537 (continuous
flow of interstate commerce to retailer found by reason of manufacturer's
control over resale price and integrated distribution service) ; In the
Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, (1937) 25 F. T. C. 1228; In
the Matter of Bausch & Lomb Optical Company, (1939) 28 F. T. C. 186;
In the Matter of Simmons Company, (1939) 29 F. T. C. 727.
27Contra: Abouaf v. J. D. & A. B. Spreckels Co., (N.D. Cal. 1939)
26 F. Supp. 830 (buyer discriminated against must be engaged in inter-
state commerce).
2 8Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, Nos. 10, 16, 19, 20, 21, 28, 29,
34 (practically), 35, 36, 51, 61, 63. Trade associations, not themselves en-
gaged in commerce, have been found to have engaged in unfair methods direct-
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EFFECT ON COMPETITION
Section 2 (a) reads
"and where the effect of such discrimination may be substan-
tially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them.1:2$a
The last part was added by the amendments, because Con-
gress wanted to be able to prevent price discrimination before
competition had been substantially lessened or a monopoly had
tended to be created, but some question arises whether "sub-
stantially" should not also be read into this last clause. Although
each of the enumerated effects on competition is separate and
distinct, a "rule of reason" accomplishing almost the same result
has been applied. The commission, under the amendments, can
come to the rescue of competitors before they have gone under in
the struggle or they can have a cause of action themselves before
being completely put out of business as soon as ascertainable
monetary damages occur. In other words the new Act becomes
applicable at an earlier stage to stop the trend toward monopoly
and to protect the existence of the small entrepreneur.2 9 In the
ly affecting commerce. In the Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., (1937)
25 F. T. C. 1228; In the Matter of Golf Ball Manufacturers' Ass'n, (1938)
26 F. T. C. 824; In the Matter of United Fence Manufacturers Ass'n,
(1938) 27 F. T. C. 377; In the Matter of Quality Bakers of America,
(1939) 28 F. T. C. 1507, modified (1939) 29 F. T. C. 1328, aff'd, (C.C.A.
1st Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 393, (violation of subsection (c) with same re-
quirements as to commerce, answering argument that sale of services is
not interstate commerce). The Act reads "where such commodities are sold
for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory
thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other
place under the jurisdiction of the United States." Although sales for
export do not come within the Act, false export sales will not be allowed.
Gaskill, What You May and May Not Do Under the New Price Dis-
crimination Law: Robinson-Patman Law (1936) 26. See McLaughlin,
The Courts and the Robinson-Patman Act: Possibilities of Strict Con-
struction, (1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 410, 414 (no violation of Act
if chattels sold without specification for purpose for which sold). The
use of mails to send money across state lines has also been used as ajurisdictional element. In the Matter of Quality Bakers of America,
(1939) 28 F. T. C. 1507.28aItalics supplied.
20Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936) 5; H. R. Rep. No.
2287, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936) 8. The new emphasis is on protection of
the inaIividual competitor rather than of competition in general. Hamilton
and Loevinger, The Second Attack on Price Discrimination: The Robinson-
Patman Act, (1937) 22 Wash. U. L. Q. 153, 163 (injury to competitor is
pro tanto injury to competition). But cf. Abouaf v. J. D. & A. B.
Spreckels Co., (N.D. Cal. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 830 (individual injured must
himself be engaged in interstate commerce to find requisite injury to
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Goodyear Case under the old Clayton Act, sec. 2, the commission
had attempted to reach the same result by interpreting the words
"where the effect of such discrimination may be" as indicating
that it was only a tendency and a probable effect rather than
actual results that were important in testing the harmful conse-
quences of a particular price discrimination. Furthermore, the
words "substantially lessen competition" were not to be taken in
a quantitative or arithmetical sense. Competition could not be
measured with a yardstick. "May be" indicated neither bare
possibility nor certainty, but probability to be deduced from the
intent or inherent character of the acts themselves.
The first complaint issued under the Robinson-Patman Act
was dismissed after full hearing chiefly on the ground that the
requisite effect on competition did not exist. In In the Matter of
Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation,3" respondent was charged with
discrimination in price in the use of quantity and volume dis-
counts in sales of cheese to retailers. But the evidence indicated
that the use of discounts similar to those used by respondent was
prevalent in the industry. Even with respondent's discounts its
products sold at retail prices exceeding those of its competitors.
Hence respondent was not unfairly depriving competitors of busi-
ness, promoting a monopoly or lessening competition with them.
In the buyers' line of commerce, even if an unjustified price
favoritism had been shown, no perceptible injury to those who did
not so benefit was manifested, since the difference in price
amounted only to three-fourths of a cent a package or less, and
retail prices varied as to cheese products as much as two or three
cents a package. Furthermore, concerns receiving the discount
from respondent sold at higher prices than those not receiving it.
The commission further indicated that an injury to competition in
the buyers' line of commerce serious enough to warrant a cease
and desist order against price discrimination causing it was not
manifested where the effect of failure to acquire the discount was
not the need of selling at a loss, but at most only the receipt of a
smaller profit than was realized by others receiving such dis-
competition) ; Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., (D. Md. 1938) 26 F.
Supp. 824 (replacing injured competitor results in no injury to competi-
tion in buyer's line).
30(1937) 25 F. T. C. 537. For discussions of the case see Smith and
McConnell, An Analysis of FTC Action on 66 Robinson-Patman Act
Cases, Dun's Review for Jan., 1938; Walsh, Substantial Lessening of
Competition, 249 and Aronson, Defenses Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
212, both in Werne, Business and the Robinson-Patman Law (1938).
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count. An annual $6.50 differential had such a remote and
minute effect on the income of the less favored competitors that
it could not be considered injurious to competition.
When the Act says "where the effect of such discrimination,"
it requires that a causal connection be established between the
price practices of the seller and the harm done to competition.
Thus here, because of other factors involved, the receipt of the
discount could not be said to have governed the retail price of the
cheese products, although trade may have been diverted to the
beneficiary of the price discrimination and diversion of trade is an
element of injury to competition. But such an injury to com-
petitors can only be attributed to price differentials, if such
differentials themselves exercise a perceptible influence upon
retail prices. Hence the price differential must result in lower
resale prices, which in turn must cause a diversion of consumers'
buying power to render such differential a violation of sec. 2 (a).
But besides lower resale prices other customer appeals, made
possible by price favoritism, may cause trade diversion.
The amendments were passed among other things to enable
the commission to protect the market of the independent, old-line
distributors. But a reasonable probability must exist, before a
cease and desist order will be entered, that, if the price discrimin-
ations involved were allowed to continue, the standing of such
independents in the competitive field will be impaired. To this
extent in so far as an individual competitor can show any mone-
tary injury, this injury-to-competition element of a cause of
action under the Robinson-Patman Act may be more easily
provable in a suit prosecuted by a private litigant than in govern-
ment-prosecuted proceedings. Such a reasonable interpretation
of the Act in the latter action should allay the fears, arising upon
its passage, over its disastrous consequences to business.31
A five per cent alternative discount in favor of group buyers,
billed jointly and taking more than $100 worth a week, was found
to be far from injuring, but rather fostering competition of the
small independent distributors who could not otherwise earn the
other discounts, and who were the only ones who could qualify
as group buyers for this alternative discount.
3 2
2lLevy, The Robinson-Patman Act-A Year's Retrospect (1937);
McLaughlin, The Courts and The Robinson-Patman Act: Possibilities of
Strict Construction, (1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 410.
32A discount to loaf cheese buyers in 750 lb. lots or over of one-half a
cent a pound was presumed to be of even less significance as injuring
competition than the discounts previously considered, to which a further
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In In the Matter of Bird & Son33 respondent had been sell-
ing felt base floor coverings to retailers at prices fourteen and
eighteen per cent higher than to Montgomery Ward & Company
and other mail-order houses. When the Robinson-Patman Act
was passed, only one per cent of all of respondent's sales were
made directly to any retailer, this sales practice being pursuant to
a change of policy to one of selling only through jobbers, com-
pleted by October, 1936. The complaint was filed September
30th. The commission found that any price discrimination dur-
ing that transition period was incidental to such change and in-
volved only a negligible portion of respondent's business. Hence
no injury to competition existed, and even if so it had ceased.34
While the Clayton Act was designed primarily to prevent
lessening of competition and monopoly in the manufacturer-
seller's line of commerce, the Robinson-Patman Act shifted the
emphasis with the growth of large scale distributors to preserv-
ing competition in the buyer's line. And this situation is pre-
sented in most of the cases before the commission thus far. But
findings as to injury to competition in the seller's line is also
found in many cases. Price discrimination as such does not seem
to injure competition with the seller unless other seller-competi-
tors do not give the favored buyer the same low price. The
real point here seems to be not that the seller gives one purchaser
a better price than he gives another competing purchaser, but
that he gives one purchaser a better price than another competing
seller gives that same purchaser. A finding confined to the former
discount of one cent a pound on orders of thirty pounds or over was
compared. Respondent's price policy in In the Matter of Shefford Cheese
Co., (1937) 25 F. T. C. 1209, was found similar, most items being identical,
with that of the Kraft Case. To reach the same conclusion because of
price identity without an independent investigation seems unwise.
33(1937) 25 F. T. C. 548. A retailer himself may be guilty of an
illegal price discrimination. Cf. In the 'Matter of United States Rubber
Company, (1939) 28 F. T. C. 1489.
34But a negligible portion of a seller's business may still be a large part
of the buying field.
The Commission said, (1937) 25 F. T. C. 552, "By the end of
October, 1936, no goods were being sold direct to retailers, while jobbers
and mail order houses were being sold at the same net prices." This fact
would give mail order houses a big advantage over retailers buying
through jobbers and would result in injury to competition, even though
prices were uniform to all purchasers. Compare the discrimination inherent
in the uniform delivered price and in unreasonable customer classification;
i.e., according to a retailer wholesale prices. See Kaylin, Retailing Under
the Patman Act in Werne, Business and the Robinson-Patman Law
(1938) 134.
THE ROBINSON-PA TMAN ACT
fact seems irrelevant to the issue of the latter. 5 Yet the commis-
sion regularly discovers injury to competition with the seller,
both when injury to competition among buyers is certain and
when there is no such injury. But often injury to competition
among buyers has adverse effects on the seller's competitors, so
that the seller's price policy indirectly by way of injuring the buyers
affects competition with itself.3"
The commission in In the Matter of H. C. Brill Company37
indicated how far it would extend the meaning of "may be" in
connection with the new clause added by the 1936 Amendments
to authorize a cease and desist order against a price discrimination.
Although here a 2.25 per cent price differential, which meant the
difference between profit and loss on a product of as little im-
portance as ice cream powders, might not alone have been sufficient
to give the chain store buyer there involved-the A & P Stores-
an appreciable competitive advantage in all of its business, yet
an accumulation of several such discounts from many sellers of
different commodities, each alone of no effect, would give such
buyer a decided competitive advantage.3 8 If one such discount
cannot be prohibited, none can.
15See Hamilton & Loevinger, The Second Attack on Price Dis-
crimination: The Robinson-Patman Act, (1937) 22 Wash. U. L. Q. 156
(discrimination not cause of seller competition injury, but cut price) ; cf.
In the Matter of Christmas Club, (1937) 25 F. T. C. 1116 (only injury
to seller's line of commerce found, since Commission not interested in com-
petition between banks, Clayton Act, sec. 11, and lessening of competition
in sale of "systems" not kind of problems involved in field of marketing
standardized commodities, with competition in which Act is concerned);
In the Matter of United Fence Manufacturers Ass'n, (1938) 27 F. T. C.
377; In the Matter of Metz Brothers Baking Company, Docket No. 3740
(F.T.C. Dec. 28, 1939).
30See In the Matter of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., (1936) 22
F. T. C. 232; In the Matter of American Optical Co., (1939) 28 F.T.C.
169 (favored treatment of retailers diverted business from independent
wholesalers on whom more limited-line manufacturers depend for
existence); In the Matter of Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., (1939) 28
F. T. C. 186; In the Matter of Simmons Co., (1939) 29 F. T. C. 727.
37(1938) 26 F. T. C. 666.
38Similarly whether only one instance of price discrimination war-
rants a cease and desist order depends on the injury to competition or a
competitor involved. Cf. In the Matter of National Numbering Machine
Company, Docket No. 3889 (F.T.C. Dec. 19, 1939) (only two specific
sales found) ; see Gordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act-
The Meaning of Sections 1 and 3, (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 593, 594-5 (argu-
able that single act of discrimination not sufficient-that the injury must be
continuing or recurrent) ; cf. In the Matter of Standard Brands Incor-
porated, (1939) 29 F. T. C. 121. "to injure, destroy, or prevent competi-
tion with" the buyer connotes directly harming the unfavored buyer.
Actually the effect on competition results from unduly benefiting the
favored buyer. The lower price to such favored buyer enables him either
to sell at a lower price or to give better service to the customer. Even
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The commission in passing on the effect of a price discrimina-
tion has indicated that the obstruction and prevention of the estab-
lishment of new distributing enterprises may be a sufficient preven-
tion of competition to warrant a cease and desist order.3 In so
far as "to injure, destroy, . . . competition" connotes actual com-
petition already existing, "prevent" would seem to be construed
in the same way. And the difficulty of ascertaining the potential
existence of imminent competition, but nipped at the outset be-
cause of the price favoritism, may be such as further to preclude
such an extended interpretation. But the chances of an unwise
extension of the meaning of the Act herein is not manifest when
such findings are coupled with those of an injury to actually
existing competition.
The commission has been very reasonable in requiring a show-
ing of substantial injury to competitors. 40 Thus price. discounts,
otherwise illegal, in the range of all average buyers, even though
not all purchase, can have no adverse effect on competition.4,
But a further extension of this "rule of reason" has been indi-
cated, even though an injury to competition is present, in a justifi-
cation for price-discrimination based upon trade practices and
policies, the reasonableness of which is manifest to the commis-
sion.42 Yet no specific wording of the Act seems to authorize any
the pocketing of greater profits might injure competition. If a better
discount is found and trade is thereby diverted, the commission does not
inquire into how it is done.
39See In the Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., (1937) 25
F. T. C. 1228; In the Matter of Golf Ball Manufacturers' Ass'n, (1938) 26
F. T. C. 824. Both cases, however, in addition involved charges under
the Federal Trade Commission Act.
40Smith and McConnell, An Analysis of FTC Action on 66 Robinson-
Patman Act Cases, Dun's Review for Jan., 1938; Letter of W. A. Ayres,
supra note 6, Nos. 1, 4, 15, 16, 24, 30, 32, 34, 35, 38, 39, 42, 43, 52, 62.
41Cf. In the Matter of Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., (1937) 25 F. T. C.
537 (exchange of deteriorated cheeses enables all buyers to take advantage
of quantity discounts) ; In the Matter of American Optical Co., (1939) 28
F. T. C. 169 (largest discount on fifty units in reach of all) ; In the Matter
of Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., (1939) 28 F. T. C. 186; In the Matter
of Standard Brands Incorporated, (1939) 29 F. T. C. 121 (discounts on
foil yeast found discriminatory prior to April, 1940 in modified order)
(F.T.C. May 8, 1940); Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, No. 30
(discount plan open to all) ; cf. In the Matter of Biddle Purchasing Co.,
(1937) 25 F. T. C. 564, 573, "No subscriber has any exclusive right to the
Biddle services, but they are sold to any wholesaler who wants them,
subject only to the requirement that we (sic.) have good credit rating."
In the Matter of Oliver Bros., (1937) 26 F. T. C. 200. But such price dis-
counts in the range of all buyers should be made known to all. Lack of
knowledge is just as injurious to competition as lack of ability to purchase
in the requisite quantities to earn the discount, cf. In the Matter of Curtice
Bros. Co., Docket No. 3381 (F.T.C. April 15, 1940).
42Thus in the Kraft Case the discount on large purchases was really
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price policy as rendering lawful an otherwise illegal price dis-
crimination.
Competition is materially influenced by the type of customer
to whom sales are made. Thus sales to federal government
agencies have been ruled exempt from the Act." Although this
ruling did not include sales to state agencies, the same result
should be reached, because government purchases are ordinarily
for consumption. Consequently competition by buyers in the
resale business is not injured, 44 no competition existing between a
consumer and a distributor. But competition between consumers
can be affected. The Act does not contemplate the protection of
competition only in the business of sale and resale of commodities.
It speaks of price discrimination "where such commodities are
sold for use, consumption. . . ." Commercial or industrial users
of commodities can be equally as handicapped in the competitive
struggle because of the discrimination practiced against them in
the cost of goods they use as can be concerns which for resale
purchase at discriminatory prices. The statutory language quoted
appears to contemplate this situation. One ground for sus-
taining the decision in In the Mllatter of American Oil Company
and General Finance4 is based on it. On this interpretation of
the facts, there the purchaser of gasoline and petroleum products
received a favorable price differential on purchases for its own
commercial use, namely resales in form only to taxicabs owned
or operated by six corporations, which respondent-buyer con-
trolled through stock and taxicab ownership. Orders for resale
to the public generally were billed to respondent at the customary
retailer prices. Although sales for consumption by the taxicabs
may have been considered sales at retail, yet if the corporate
a sales promotion discount to push sales and make the truck delivery system
worth operating. In the Bird Case elimination of sales to retailers except
Montgomery Ward was found justified to cut distribution costs. Letter
of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, No. 24 (denial of quantity lots and dis-
counts to those who could not sell product before it deteriorated). See
Smith & McConnell, An Analysis of FTC Action on 66 Robinson-Patman
Act Cases, Dun's Review for Jan., 1938, at 47.43See (1936) 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539. See also (1937) 0. A. G. Minn.
342e (not applicable to state purchases or business concerns bidding for
them); 26 0. A. G. Wis. 142.
44Cf. Letter of V. A. Ayres, supra note 6, Nos. 14, 42.
4-1(1939) 29 F. T. C. 857. Cf. In the Matter of United States Rub-
ber Company, (1939) 28 F. T. C. 1489 ("purchaser" may be consumer) ;
In the Matter of Standard Brands Incorporated, (1939) 29 F. T. C. 121
(yeast buyer is baker); In the Matter of Anheuser-Busch, Inc., Docket
No. 2987 (F.T.C. May 11, 1940) (yeast) and Docket No. 3798 (F.T.C.
September 25, 1940) (corn syrup). Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note
6, No. 63 (seller requires contract of buyer himself to use tires).
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fiction and formal bookkeeping were disregarded, respondent was
the real consumer. 46  Competition with respondent considered as
a retailer of this gasoline could hardly have been injured by the
price differentials granted, since the taxicabs, owned or controlled
by respondent, would have purchased gasoline of respondent
even if no favorable discount had existed. This trade was already
diverted to respondent. No causation would have existed. Thus
it was only in the operation of taxicabs that competition could
have been injured with respondent in so far as it was able to buy
gasoline for consumption at lower prices than other taxicab com-
panies and such costs were a major factor in the taxicab business.
Similarly buyers who are located in different localities ordi-
narily neither resell in the same area nor compete for customers.
It is impossible to discover an injury to competition between them.
But in In the M11 atter of National Numbering Machine Company, 47
where the two purchasers involved were located in New York and
Boston respectively, the commission concluded that they were
in active competition in the resale of the machines involved.
Thus in spite of two different buying areas, each in itself a large
market, the two buyers might have retailed in both areas. Or the
price differential might have more than covered transportation
costs, so that buyers in New York City, when discovering such
price differential, if it were passed on, would have been attracted
to the Boston dealer. But even if because of price variations
granted in different localities no injury to competition among
buyers is found, still harm may result to competition among
sellers. 4 8 When a price discrimination is found where by reason
of a uniform delivered price more distant purchasers receive an
undeserved benefit over those more closely situated to the seller,
it is more difficult to see how competition is injured between
buyers. As the discrimination becomes proportionately more
extreme, the overlapping of the competitive areas of the buyers
by reason of distance becomes less.49
46The commission has disregarded the corporate fiction in other cases,
as in In the Matter of the Webb Crawford Co., (1938) 27 F. T. C. 1099;
Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, No. 38 (to find no injury to
competition).
47Docket No. 3889 (F.T.C. December 19, 1939).
48See In the Matter of Metz Bros. Baking Company, Docket No. 3740
(F.T.C. December 28, 1939); cf. Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6,
Nos. 39, (wholesalers not doing business in same community) ; 43 (favored
customer in area where seller has no other customer).
49 Cf. In the Matter of United Fence Manufacturers Ass'n, (1938) 27
F. T. C. 377.
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OR WITH CUSTOMERS OF EITHER OF THEM
An addition to the effect-on-competition clause in the amend-
ments of 1936 is the words---"or with customers of either of
them," meaning customers of either the buyer or the seller.50 The
buyer himself is a customer of the seller so that the requirement
that the injured competition must be "with any person who .. .
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination," is thus
effectively nullified. Ordinarily most buyers will know that they
are receiving a price favoritism, but to authorize a cease and
desist order against a seller such buyer-knowledge seems im-
material. Competition among buyers can be as seriously injured
regardless of buyer knowledge. And a similar order cannot be
entered against a buyer unless he knowingly induces or knowingly
receives a discrimination in price.505
In determining the effect caused by the seller's prices on
competition among the customers of the immediate purchaser the
commission has shown a tendency to telescope this two-step
process. In the Kraft Case it characterized a retailer who bought
cheese products from jobbers and wholesalers as a "purchaser"
along with retailers who bought directly from respondent-
producer. Thus the price discrimination can be said to have
been made between such retailers supplied through a jobber or
wholesaler and the other buyers purchasing directly. The justifi-
cation for such a characterization lay in respondent's recognition
of such retailers as its own customers by personally soliciting
them and carrying out in sales to them a system of resale price
maintenance. "A retailer is none the less a purchaser because
he buys indirectly if, as here, the manufacturer deals with him
directly in promoting the sale of his products and exercises con-
trol over the terms upon which he buys."'" The seller must be
the one to give a price difference. This element of control over
the resale price justifies the conclusion that respondent here was
the one to give the varying discounts to retailers and not the jobber-
5OIt has been indicated that "customers of either" means the seller's
other customers. See Zorn and Feldman, Business Under the New Price
Laws (1937) 97. But cf. 113-116. But competition with another customer
can be injured only if he is favored in some way and this occurs by re-
ceiving the benefit of a price discrimination. Literally it must be a
customer of a knowing customer with whom competition is injured. Query
whether "knowingly" will be read into the second customer?
0aSee p. 185, infra.
"lIn the Matter of Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., (1937) 25 F. T. C.
537, 546. This expanded definition of "purchases" was applied to sec. 2(e).
In the Matter of Luxor, Ltd., Docket No. 3736 (F.T.C. July 31, 1940).
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intermediary and that the retailer, buying from the jobber, was a
purchaser within the meaning of the Act. To hold otherwise
would permit a vendor to favor one retailer over another by hav-
ing an independent, but compliant, jobber pass on the price bene-
fits in the form of a resale, where only the jobber would be the
purchaser. But competition could here be said to be injured "with
customers of" such jobber-in this case, the retailer, himself not
a "purchaser." Thus when only two successive sales are involved,
the expanded definition of "purchaser" makes no difference. It
would be otherwise, when the injured competitor is in a line of
commerce three sales removed from the original discriminating
seller. Thus the necessity for such an expanded definition of
"purchaser" does not here readily appear, except to sustain a
cease and desist order against a seller whose price discriminations
are passed on to a customer of the customer of his customer. In
so far as a seller is made responsible for the passing-on of the
favorable price by his purchaser, difficulty arises when such
seller has not the slightest control over whether this price differ-
ential is passed on or not. But, if a vendor accords a better dis-
count to one vendee-jobber, he might well foresee that its effects
might be passed on in whole or in part with consequential harmful
effects on competition among more remote vendees and thus be
held liable for such effects.
In the Bird Case52 the commission indicated that it would
not extend this definition of "purchasers" beyond the limits of
the elements laid down in the Kraft-Phenix Case. Here the same
reasons might well have existed to call retailers, who bought
through jobbers, "purchasers" from respondent manufacturer in
order to prohibit the jobber discount to Montgomery Ward, in
reality selling at retail, which discount would have a harmful
effect on the competition with Montgomery Ward by those re-
tailers buying through jobbers. Furthermore the words-"to
injure, . . . competition . . . with customers of" the purchasers-
would not fit this situation, because here it is the competitive
ability of those customers themselves that is being injured in
rplation to their competitor, Montgomery Ward, and not vice
versa, which is the situation contemplated by the statutory
wording.
The expanded definition of "purchasers" first enunciated in
the Kraft-Phenix Case was essential to find even a price difference
52(1937) 25 F. T. C. 548.
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in In the Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company,53 where
member manufacturers of respondent trade association sold direct-
ly at a uniform price only to "quantity buyers" and at a higher
uniform price indirectly to "carload lot buyers" through such
"quantity buyers." It was necessary to call the "carload lot
buyers" "purchasers" from respondent-manufacturer-sellers in
order to find a price discrimination "between different purchasers"
-here the two classes of buyers. This conclusion was justifiable
inasmuch as respondent-manufacturers through their trade asso-
ciation supervised the practices and policies of distributors, some
of which were their own outlets engaged in the resale of window
glass, in order to effectuate the price practices laid down, required
uniformity in such practices and methods, and in general acted
concertedly to control the channels of distribution. A customer
of a distributor-agent of the seller can be said to be a purchaser
from such seller. To the extent that the seller exercises the same
control over the terms of resale to a buyer from an independent
distributor, such buyer may still be said to be a purchaser from
such seller within the meaning of the Act.
The commission concluded that the price differentials involved
in In the Matter of Agricultural Laboratories"4 might have had
the effect of preventing competition with customers of respondent's
favored distributor. This could occur, it would appear, only
if the benefit of such price differentials were passed on, in whole
or in part, by such favored distributor to his own customers, so
that the latter could undersell their own competitors who either
bought directly from respondent at the higher retail prices or who
bought from wholesalers, not accorded by respondent such ad-
vantageous price discounts and thus unable to pass on any similar
price advantages to their own retailer-customers. Although the
argument could be made that these retailers, buying of the less
favored wholesaler, were not discriminated against in so far as
they could have bought of the favored wholesalers who were
passing on price benefits received, in actuality retailers do not
change over and buy from such wholesalers either because of
ignorance of the trade advantages involved, habit, or both. Hence
the real cause of injury to competition in such retailers' line may
be said to have been the respondent's price practices.5
-3(1937) 25 F. T. C. 1228.
r4(1938) 26 F. T. C. 296; Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, No. 62
(no evidence functional differential was passed on).
55If the fact-that a price ad-antage is open to all in a situation
to meet its terms-were a defense to a charge of price discrimination, no
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The commission indicated in In the Matter of illiami Whole-
sale Drug Corporation5' the extent to which it would apply the
words of sec. 2 (a) "or with customers of either of them." Re-
spondent-a wholesaler of drug products-receiving a 33% to 50
per cent greater discount, was thus able to resell to other whole-
salers at prices below those at which competitors of such other
wholesalers could buy directly from the manufacturer-sellers of
such products. Also both respondent and its wholesaler-customers
could undersell their wholesale rivals in this way. The commission
found an injurious effect on competition with not only respondent's
wholesaler-customers (customers of the recipient of the price
discrimination), but also with customers (retailers) of those
wholesalers to whom respondent sold (customers of the customers
of the recipient of the price favoritism). The statutory language
does not appear to justify extending the recognition of the effects
on competition of the price discrimination by this extra step.
Congress probably felt that a line must be drawn on the respon-
sibility of a seller for the permeating effects of a price differential,
which he has given, on competition among more remote buyers.
Yet as a matter of proximate causation this respondent-buyer
might well be held responsible for the results of his price prac-
tice, for this responsibility is no greater in scope than that which
sec. 2 (a) already imposes on the seller-responsibility, which in
each case involves a causal connection of only two steps.
57
TYPEs OF PRIcE DISCRI-MINATION
(a) INDIRECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION.-Section 2 (a) makes
it unlawful "either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price.
violation of the Act would ever exist in spite of injury to competition, a
small buyer not being able to attain the size of a large one and to meet
the terms of such quantity discounts. In the Matter of H. C. Brill Co.,
(1938) 26 F. T. C. 666 (willingness to accord cumulative discount to
all mere idle gesture). But in so far as a discount can be taken advantage
of by all buyers and some do not, their injury arises from their own
fault.
56(1939) 28 F. T. C. 485.
57In so far as the Miami Case involved a buyer guilty of inducing
a violation of subsection (d), the provision of subsection (a), concerning
injury to remote lines of competition, is inapplicable. Other cases in which
the commission has extended its findings as to injury to competition to
customers of customers have been-In the Matter of Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., (1937) 25 F. T. C. 1228; In the Matter of United States Rubber
Co., (1939) 28 F. T. C. 1489; see Montague, Merchandising Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, (1936) 5 (passing on discounts makes seller viola-
tor of Act); Buckley, The Robinson-Patman Act-An Interpretation,
(1939) 9 Am. L. School Rev. 311, 313, 315; McAllister, Price Control by
Law in the United States: A Survey, (1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob.
273, 294 (vendor responsibility for price policy of vendee cannot stand
without showing of complicity of vendor with such vendee).
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The other subsections of the amendment-(c), (d), and
(e)-while involving specific practices which are considered to be
unfair and hence harmful per se without regard to a finding of
their effect on competition, describe forms of indirect price dis-
crimination.- But not every indirect method of discrimination in
price can be imagined, let alone proscribed in specific terms in the
statute. Hence "indirectly" in see. 2 (a) is designed to cover all
such subsequently designed methods.
Some of these methods were illustrated in In the Matter of
Agricultural Laboratories," where respondent was engaged in the
sale of nitrogen-fixing bacteria used to inoculate seeds of legu-
minous plants. Some retailers and wholesalers, although paying
a uniform price, effective for all buyers, received the cultures of
bacteria at such price delivered, others paying the transportation
charges. Some purchasers, such as mail-order houses, were further
favored with the privilege of returning unsold cultures. All whole-
salers except one received the same privilege of returning unsold
goods up to ten per cent of their annual purchases. This wag a
valuable privilege, because unsold goods were practically worth-
less when returned. On these facts the commission found dis-
criminations in price. For respondent to refund to all whole-
salers except one the costs of unsold goods up to ten per cent of
their annual purchases, resulted in a reduction of price to such
wholesalers only, if from this assurance they would purchase
larger amounts than they knew could ever be resold in order to
take advantage of any quantity discounts given. In this way a
wholesaler could receive a lower price with the same volume of
resale business than any wholesaler not accorded the same
privilege. But there was no evidence here of any such quantity
discount. Also, in so far as all wholesalers accurately estimated
their resale business, uniformity of treatment would exist. Annual
purchases would probably never run ten per cent over needs,
even if impossible of exact estimation, so that the mail-order
houses with the unlimited return of goods privilege would be
WSA discrimination in "terms of sale" was stricken from the Senate
draft of the Act by the conferees, their opinion being that the Act should
be inapplicable eccept to terms of sale amounting to price discrimination.(1936) H. R. Rep. No. 2951 74th Cong. 2d Sess. 5.
59See In the Matter of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
(1938) 26 F. T. C. 486, 501.
00(1938) 26 F. T. C. 296. Other cases involving discrimination in
the form of allowance of carriage charges are: In the Matter of Albert
L. Whiting, (1938) 26 F. T. C. 312 (postage); In the Matter of Master
Lock Co., (1938) 27 F. T. C. 982 (freight).
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receiving little if any price advantage. Furthermore, the latter
paid from four to six cents more per bushel than the wholesalers,
thus presumptively cancelling any discrimination in their favor.
Farm bureaus competing in reselling at retail with the mail-order
houses received no such privilege of returning unsold goods. But
the fact that they received a six cents lower price than the mail-
order houses probably more than nullified any disadvantage.,1
Although a cash payment by respondent to wholesalers or
mail-order houses for all unsold goods in taking them back at
the end of a fixed period looks like a cumulative discount, such
favored wholesalers had already paid respondent-seller more than
a wholesaler not receiving such a rebate, because the former pur-
chased more cultures. Standing alone, it is difficult to see that any
discrimination, even indirect, in price here exists, since the net
effect does not reduce the price to one buyer over that accorded
another. Yet, if the evidence shows that an unfavored purchaser
has been injured in his competition with the favored ones, the
inference arises that probably that practice found was the cause.
But a price discrimination must exist before its effect on com-
petition is investigated. A harmful effect on competition cannot
alone be used to infer that the cause was a price discrimination.
The amendment does not cover all kinds of discrimination that
by means of terms of sale may have an injurious consequence on
competition, but only those in price. Transactions disconnected
from individual sales of goods, however, may be discriminations
in price. Thus in the Goodyear Case an assignment by the tire
manufacturer-seller of 18,000 shares of its common treasury
stock and the payment of $800,000 in cash to Sears, Roebuck &
Company, the purchaser under a contract to buy, without similar
assignments and payments to its other regular customers, was
held a discrimination in price.62 Although, as a matter of book-
keeping, the final net result to such favored buyer would be a
reduction of the purchase price of tires bought, nevertheless it is
difficult to see the discrimination as one of price when it can be
made totally independent of any sale, even though, as in this case,
it was made as part of a contract to sell and contemplated sales in
the future, which were made. Since the net result of almost every
61The return-of-unsold-goods privilege is similar to the promotional
discounts found justifiable in the Kraft Case.621n the Matter of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., (1936) 22 F. T. C.
232. George, The Federal Trade Commission Decision in the Goodyear
Case, (1936) Dun & Bradstreet Monthly Review. But Goodyear added
this expense into the cost of tires sold to Sears.
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discrimination of a seller in favor of one buyer is to lower the
latter's cost of goods sold, to enable him to gain more profits and
hence to acquire a competitive advantage, the commission should
be allowed a wide leeway in broadening the limits of what is
considered indirect discrimination in price."-
(b) CU ULATIVE DIscouNTs.-The question of whether
cumulative or volume discounts are illegal price discriminations
has occupied the attention of the commission in several cases, of
which the leading one is It the Matter of H. C. Brill Company.64
Respondent-a manufacturer of ice cream preparations-had
separate contracts with the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Com-
pany and two other chain stores reciting that "in view of the
purchases in large quantities present and prospective" respondent
agreed to allow quantity discounts on amounts bought for a
year's period, the discount being payable at the end thereof and
varying from a low of one per cent on an annual volume of $5,000
to three per cent on $15,000. The respondent-seller further ex-
pressed willingness to make the same agreement "with any other
purchaser similarly situated and on proportionately equal terms."
Only two of the chain stores ever qualified for any discount there-
under, the A. & P. receiving the three per cent by combining the
annual purchases of each of its warehouses which were solicited,
6zCf. Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, No. 13 (trouser buying
retailer required manufacturer-seller to buy buttons for trousers made, from
a jobber in consideration of latter's paying retailer five per cent on all
buttons sold thereunder). Free deals are also an indirect type of price
discrimination. Nos. 5 (two loaves of bread for price of one treated like
quantity discount); 7 (two cup-cakes with every purchase of loaf of
bread). Cash discounts, in so far as they are administered loosely, can
result in price discrimination, as when one buyer still gets the advantage
of such price discount, although not paying on time. Compare uniform
delivered prices p. 159, infra.
64(1938) 26 F. T. C. 666. Quantity discounts are often in reality
cumulative discounts. See In the Matter of the Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., (1936) 22 F. T. C. 232; In the Matter of Master Lock Co.,(1938) 27 F. T. C. 982; In the 'Matter of American Optical Co., (1939)
28 F. T. C. 169; In the Matter of Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., (1939) 28
F. T. C. 186; In the Matter of Standard Brands Incorporated, (1939)
29 F. T. C. 121; In the Matter of Simmons Co., (1939) 29 F. T. C. 727
(retroactive cash rebate on total number of yearly orders) ; In the Matter of
Anheuser-Busch, Docket No. 2987 (F.T.C. May 11, 1940). In so far as the
buyer contracts to take a definite, large amount over a fixed period
delivered in odd quantities, his order may be a single purchase and the
discount a true quantity discount. The promise of the buyer in the Brill
Case the commission evidently considered illusory. The buyers used the
same type of a promise to avoid see. 2 (c) of the Act in In the Matter of
Atlantic Commission Co., Docket No. 3344 (F.T.C. July 24, 1940). A pur-
chase for future delivery is tested to ascertain its discriminatory character as
of the time of entering the order, not that of actual delivery. Cf. Letter of
W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, No. 48; In the Matter of the Nitragin Company,
(1938) 26 F. T. C. 320.
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shipped to, and billed separately by respondent-seller. The dis-
count did not relate to individual orders, none of which ever
approached the lowest discount figure. A price discrimination was
found. The commission did not base its decision on the ground
that the discount was in the form of an annual rebate, which looks
more discriminatory than a lower net price on each individual sale,
but indicated that cost savings on such individual orders could
legally be withheld, cumulated, and paid over in the form of a
rebate at the end of a period of time. Such rebate then would
not be a cumulative or volume discount, but a true quantity
discount.
(c) FUNCTIONAL DISCOU'T-CusTOMER CLASSIFICATION.-
Many fears were expressed when the Robinson-Patman Act was
passed that it would outlaw functional discounts, since whole-
salers usually receive a lower price than retailers. If all buyers
must be treated alike, the violation of sec. 2 (a) would be clear.
The problem seems to be approachable from the question of effect
on competition. A true wholesaler or jobber, properly so classi-
fied, is not in competition with a retailer, because he does not resell
to the same customers. Hence no adverse effect on competition
between such wholesale and retail buyers is manifested.6' Grant-
ing ordinary functional discounts, furthermore, seems to have
no effect on competition with the seller.
The commission expressly recognized the validity of functional
discounts in In the Matter of Hansen Inoculator Compan y,66
where it found, to justify the price discrimination, .no "savings in
cost of production, sale, or delivery, or functions performed by
the buyer in the resale of the goods."6 6" But does this statement
indicate that the limitation of the cost savings proviso is here
placed on the amount of such functional discounts? Must a seller
demonstrate that traditional functional differentials are no greater
than the cost savings resulting to him from selling through whole-
65Another line of attack is by means of the savings of cost justifica-
tion proviso, infra, p. 161. Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, No. 4.
In so far as the justification for the existence of a wholesaler is that he
relieves the manufacturer or producer of the burdens of the costs of market-
ing, which the latter otherwise would be required to bear if sales were
made directly to retailers, definite cost savings in sales to wholesalers,
as compared to sales to retailers, can be demonstrated. No price dis-
crimination at all may exist in this situation. See Utterback in (1936)
80 Cong. Rec. 9559.
66(1938) 26 F. T. C. 303. See also Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note
6, Nos. 25 (wholesaler-retailer) ; 32 (bottlers-jobbers) ; 62 (distributors-
service station operators).
66altalics supplieu.
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salers and jobbers instead of selling more directly through re-
tailers? Such a requirement might outlaw the majority of the
traditional functional discounts, contrary to the purpose of the
Act to preserve this old-line method of distribution-producer-
wholesaler-retailer--consumer in the face of the newer methods
of the chains, mail-order houses, large department stores, coopera-
tives, and mixed function distributors. But even if such func-
tional discounts cannot be justified by cost differences, their
competitive effect would be slight in the case of the jobbers or
wholesalers whose resale market does not overlap that of retailers.
In a companion case"7 the commission indicated another, more
lenient test on which it would sustain the functional discount -
permitting jobber prices when such buyers actually rendered
jobbing services in connection with the sale of the products pur-
chased at such discounts.
The more difficult problem of functional discounts and cus-
tomer classification comes when manufacturers and producers
market through a distributor who combines several functions, a
mixed distributor who cannot be put exclusively into any one
of the old customary distributor groups, since he sells to whole-
salers, retailers, and consumers. Actual price discrimination
either in his favor or against him may occur because the seller's
single classification does not fit him.
In In the Matter of Agricultural Laboratories,8 wholesale
distributors of respondent's bacteria cultures sold both to re-
tailers and directly to farmers. Respondent sold also to mail-
order houses, farm bureaus, and a few retailers, all competing
with each other, the two former receiving much better prices than
the retailers. Competition of the retailers was impeded in so
far as respondent accorded wholesale prices to wholesalers, selling
directly to consumers. Especially would retailers, customers of
such wholesalers, be harmed in so far as the latter also resold
directly to users. Respondent had misclassified such wholesalers.
As to these sales they were really retailers. The seller, however,
should not be held responsible for an occasional consumer sale
made out of the usual distribution channel by a wholesale-buyer,
but if such practice is habitual, such a seller might well be put
on notice of such sales and price policy of his customer to whom he
directly sells. For injury to competition in some line of
commerce is certain to result-with that wholesaler, if he retains
17See In the Matter of Albert L. Whiting, (1938) 26 F. T. C. 312, 317.
'q(1938) 26 F. T. C. 296.
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the discount and with both the wholesaler and retailer, if the
discount is passed on to the retail-buyer. Likewise, in the Hansen
Case" both jobbers and farm -bureaus receiving jobber prices
undersold retailers by selling directly to consumers. The commis-
sion concluded that the difference in prices resulting from re-
spondent's method of customer classification in sales to customers
competitively engaged in reselling to consumers was a price dis-
crimination. Here functional discounts were not made in good
faith, but covered up real price discrimination. In In the ilatter of
Albert L. Whiting,7 where farm bureaus again were performing
a mixed function, but receiving on all purchases a wholesale rate,
the commission allowed such lower price on goods only when the
bureaus actually rendered jobbing services. Since the seller can
not tell beforehand what proportion of the goods sold to such
bureaus will be resold at retail and what part at wholesale, the
buyers should have such a seller readjust the prices at the end
of fixed periods, when by hindsight such proportions can be
accurately estimated. Thus, whereas functional discounts are
still valid, they cannot be used to conceal a price discrimination in
favor of "mixed" distributors.
In the reverse situation, the seller's customer-classification
can also be so rigid that purchasers who should be characterized
as wholesalers are forced to buy at retail prices. Although the
Act, it has been said, does not compel the manufacturer-seller to
grant, on a particular order, the benefit of savings in cost derived
from different methods of manufacture, sale or delivery of that
order, 7 1 so that he would not then need to accord a true whole-
saler the price benefit derived from the savings in seller's costs
arising from the taking over from such seller by this buyer of the
obligation of performing those functions of the usual wholesaler,
yet if the seller does accord such a price benefit only to sone
of the wholesale-buyers a clear discrimination against the rest
results. Thus in In the Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Coin-
panv,.7 2 where respondent-manufacturers forced some of the buy-
09(1938) 26 F. T. C. 303; In the 'Matter of Standard Brands Incorpor-
ated, (1939) 29 F. T. C. 121.
70(1938) 26 F. T. C. 312; In the Matter of the Nitragin Company,
(1938) 26 F. T. C. 320.
7'(1936) Sen. Rep. No. 1502 74th Cong. 2d Sess. 6; (1936) H. R.
Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. 9-10.
72(1937) 25 F. T. C. 1228; cf. In the Matter of Bird & Son, (1937)
25 F. T. C. 548 (same price to jobbers and mail order house). The order
in the Pittsburgh Case covered discrimination only on direct shipments to
carload lot buyers, allowing the functional discount on indirect.
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ers into the retailer class by characterizing them as "carload lot
buyers" and making them buy only from the class called "quantity
buyers," the only ones who could purchase directly from the manu-
facturers, and buy at prices seven and one-half per cent higher
than those which such "quantity buyers" paid, five per cent of
this difference going to such "quantity buyers," the commission
found a price discrimination. This process might also be described
as the reverse one-that of putting some retailers into a wholesaler
classification by forcing other retailers to buy only from them.
Investigation by the respondent-manufacturers' association was
required for a purchaser to make the "quantity buyer" list, and
hence excellent opportunities for arbitrary action and favoritism
existed. "Carload lot buyers" could not pool their orders to
obtain this more favorable discount. Such free exercise of dis-
cretion by a seller in placing customers in different functional
groups to accord to them different prices leads to the grossest
kind of price discrimination.
In In the Matter of American Oil Company 3 the commission
was strict in defining the classification of commercial consumer.
Respondent-buyer here controlled through stock and asset owner-
ship six subsidiary corporations which operated taxicabs. Gaso-
line and petroleum products purchased by respondent at a dis-
count over quotations to retail service stations were resold to these
taxicab operators. The sales were presumably within the same
corporate group. But the commission concluded that such prod-
ucts were purchased and resold at retail, thus classifying re-
spondent as a retailer of gasoline, not as a taxicab company, and
justifying a cease and desist order. The current practice-for
respondent to buy at retail prices, but then to make monthly
reports of orders resold to the public generally and those con-
sumed by the taxicabs, and on the latter orders subsequently
to receive the commercial consumer differential-constituted the
discrimination, ' 4 all orders being classified as retail sales.
(d) UNIFOiRM- DELIVERED PRIcE.-Uncertainty arises con-
73(1939) 29 F. T. C. 857. But cf. Letter of V. A. Ayres, supra note
6, No. 63 (employees of national accounts-independent tire dealers).
The commission was also strict in In the Matter of United States Rubber
Co., (1939) 28 F. T. C. 1489, where a price discrimination with resulting
injury to competition in the seller's line was found in price differences
granted to users, consumers and commercial accounts, on the one hand.
and retailers on the other.74See complaint General Motors Corporation, Docket No. 3886
(F.T.C. September 12, 1939) C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 8th ed. vol. 2 par.
9971.23 (discrimination between automobile manufacturers buying for
original equipment and a non-contract retailer-supplier).
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cerning whether price discrimination exists in the situation of the
uniform delivered price. In In the Matter of United Fence
Manufacturers Association7 5  respondent-association members
manufactured and sold snow fences, a substantial part of the
average costs of which were in transportation charges. In an
area of fourteen states each member-seller quoted a uniform
delivered price to any buyer, no matter where located in that
area. In other words, for each buyer the seller included trans-
portation costs in price. Further, uniformity of sale prices be-
tween manufacturers was maintained despite variations in cost
of production. Thus because of this uniform price understand-
ing, which gave him the same opportunity in the more distant
markets, each member-seller sacrificed his natural monopoly in his
75(1938) 27 F. T. C. 377. Cf. In the Matter of Anheuser Busch, Docket
No. 3798 (F.T.C. September 25, 1940) (varying delivered prices not justified
by differences in delivery cost). In the Matter of Bird & Son, (1937) 25
F. T. C. 548, where uniform prices granted no wholesale-differential, seems
inconsistent with the United Fence Case, where similarly uniform prices
recognized no differential for absence of transportation costs. The theory
of the commission in the United Fence Case is based on a definition of
price as being what the seller receives and not what the buyer pays (p. 8).
In so far as the commission proscribed the efforts of the Association to
prevent price differentials based on cost savings, the cease and desist order
attacked practices similar to those attacked in Sugar Institute v. United
States, (1936) 297 U. S. 553, 56 Sup. Ct. 629, 80 L. Ed. 859; see Fly, The
Sugar Institute Decisions and the Anti-Trust Laws 2; (1936) 46 Yale L. J.
228 (apparent inconsistency of Robinson-Patman Act with Sugar Institute
Case merely reflects change in emphasis from consumer to independent re-
tailer and wholesaler protection). Although no cease and desist order
has been handed down based on the complaints filed by the commission
involving the legality of the single and multiple basing point system, the
principle involved is similar to that involved in the uniform delivered price
system. The complaints are: Cast Iron Soil Pipe Ass'n, Docket No. 3091
(F.T.C. March 30, 1937), C. C. H. Trade Serv. (8th ed.) vol. 2 par. 8873;
The Cement Institute, Docket No. 3167 (F.T.C. July 5, 1937), supra, par.
9056; Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp., Docket No. 3764 (F.T.C. April 20,
1939), supra, par. 9960.14. Authorities differ as to whether the amendments
proscribe the basing point and uniform delivered price systems. See Gaskill,
What You May and May Not Do Under the New Price Discrimination
Law-Robinson-Patman Law (1936) 34-35; Zorn and Feldman, Business
Under the New Price Laws (1937) 196-201; Brown, The Scope of Federal
Power Over Price Discriminations, (1936) 10 U. Cin. L. Rev. 430, 434-5;
Hamilton & Loevinger, The Second Attack on Price Discrimination: The
Robinson-Patman Act, (1937) 22 Wash. U. L. Q. 153, 174-6; Withrow,
Basing-Point and Freight-Zone Price Systems Under the Anti-Trust
Laws, (1937) 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 690; Sharp, Discrimination and the
Robinson-Patman Act, (1938) 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 383. Whereas single and
multiple basing point systems when applied to some instances result in price
discrimination with harmful effect on competition between buyers, the
system does not seem to be illegal in toto under the Robinson-Patman Act,
especially in view of the fact that the anti-basing point provision in the
definition of price was stricken out. (1936) 80 Cong. Rec. 8223. But cf.
In the Matter of United States Steel Corp., (1924) 8 F. T. C. 1 (single
basing point illegal under Clayton Act), Note (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 548.
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local market, based upon lower carriage charges and hence more
successfully exploited by him than by his competitors. The situa-
tion was one of price uniformity, not price difference. Although
the actual effect was a discrimination against local buyers, who
otherwise would have received a lower price based upon their
geographical advantages in savings in transportation costs, yet
the Act, it has been said, does not require that cost savings be
passed on. But the commission here seems to be requiring exactly
that. In so far as competition is injured among seller-manufac-
turers, as the commission found, the cause is not the uniformity of
price that one manufacturer accords all buyers, but the uniformity
of price all manufacturers accord one buyer. Thus sec. 2 (a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act does not seem to be the method to at-
tack the price practices here involved.
ONLY DUE ALLOWANCE FOR DIFFERENCES IN COST
The first proviso in sec. 2 (a) reads:
"Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differ-
entials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost
of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered."
A price discrimination and its harmful effect on competition
either with the giver, the recipient, or their customers may be made
out, but, if it can further be demonstrated that the discount was
given because of savings to the seller in cost of manufacturing, sell-
ing, or delivering to the particular customer favored by the discount,
and that the discount was no greater than such savings, although
it could have been less, then the policy of according the buyer,
whether for resale or consumption, the benefit of the cost savings
involved outweighs the disadvantages to competition also present,
and permits the discount.
Although the cease and desist order instituted in In the Mat-
ter of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company76 was finally set aside
71J(1936) 22 F. T. C. 232; rev'd (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d)
620, cert. denied, (1939) 308 U. S. 557, 60 Sup. Ct. 74, 84 L. Ed. 468;(1936) 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1030; (1939) 11 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 259; (1939)
17 Te%. L. Rev. 517 (in circuit court of appeals). The commission con-
cluded that any intangible cost savings on Sears volume of business would
be reflected in greater or at least equal profits on that business as compared
to an equal volume of business with the independent tire dealers. A com-
parison of these two profits still left a lower profit on Sears business, the
difference being the average sales price discrimination not accounted for by
cost savings. The concealment of the prices given Sears from competitors
of Sears and Goodyears' own staff further helped to indicate that the price
differential was not a real quantity discount based on actual cost savings.
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by the circuit court of appeals, the indications given therein by
the commission, as to what elements will be considered as actual
savings in cost "resulting from the differing methods or quantities
in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or deliv-
ered," are important guides for cases arising today under the
Robinson-Patman Act Amendment. There manufacturing costs
on tires sold under the discriminatory price contract in favor of
Sears, Roebuck & Company were concededly the same as those
on tires distributed through independent Goodyear dealers. The
commission concluded that respondent had failed to show that the
price discrimination in favor of Sears against these dealers was
justified by differences in costs of transportation or selling.
Sears was not charged with any advertising or selling expenses
or interest on borrowed money. To prove a reduction in costs
attributable to the contract, respondent argued that the volume
of Sears' business had value to it in removing hazards and insuring
stability by avoiding fluctuation of profits inevitable in re-
spondent's other business and in casting on Sears the risks which
respondent normally bore of raw material price declines and
credit losses. The commission rejected this contention, because
these advantages could not be translated into precise terms of
dollars and cents benefit and were too speculative, intangible, and
remote to justify or be reasonably related to the price discrimina-
tion. Thus it would seem that, if respondent's situation were such
that it could mathematically prove a cost saving attributable solely
to Sears' contracts, a defense would be established. The com-
mission did not reject these items as falling into a class of items
not recognizable as cost savings. This problem is involved in de-
ciding whether a definite cost saving, clearly provable, can be
attributed only to one order or must be allocated to all sales or
to none at all. Thus respondent argued that Sears orders absorbed
Goodyear's overhead. The commission determined that the proper
accounting method was to allocate overhead expense impartially
to all tire units passing through the factory and that the much
larger volume of business obtained from Goodyear independent
dealers as a group was just as important to respondent as the
volume from Sears. In general, arbitrarily to attribute more
importance to one than to other customers' contribution to total
volume and to consequential per-unit reduction in overhead is no
real cost justification, but constitutes one means of creating an
unfair preferential advantage in favor of that one customer. But
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remote and unsubstantial cost differences may be disregarded. A
discount is not to be condemned merely because it does not mathe-
matically accord with cost differences. The commission then will
not split hairs, but will view the problem as a practical one de-
pending on the intent and effect of the scheme as a whole. This
has been the keynote of its attitude in subsequent cases under
the amendments.
But at the same time an important qualification to the rule-
that cost savings will justify an otherwise illegal price discrimi-
nation-was set up. Such quantity discount cannot be secret, but
must be open to all, so that any customer may purchase a similar
quantity at like price or terms. Such secrecy stigmatizes the
good faith of the seller. Injury to competition may be greater
where others cannot take advantage of the more favorable price,
not because they are not in a position to meet its requirements as
to quantity ordered, but because of their ignorance of the oppor-
tunity to purchase at such a price. This interpretation of the Act
seems to import the requirement that differentials be given ex-
pressly on account of cost savings differences, the seller having
that idea in mind, and not merely to favor one competitor over
another. Although this view may be well within the spirit of the
statute, it is doubtful whether it also fits the words, which appear
to allow a price discrimination no matter for what reason given,
if it is subsequently found to be no greater than cost savings.
The commission further indicated that cost savings sufficient
to justify a price discrimination in the form of a quantity dis-
count could arise only on individual orders. The discount in the
Goodyear Case could not be called a quantity discount, because
individual sales to Sears were no larger than those to many other
independent dealers. This view was further spelled out in the
Brill Case,77 where the conclusion was reached that, although a
purchaser of large annual amounts may buy in larger individual
shipments than buyers of smaller annual amounts, in reality the
former usually places numerous orders individually smaller than
those of the latter, with a resulting cost to the seller greater per
dollar of sales to serve such a customer, with his large number
of small orders, than to serve those with a fewer number of large
77(1939) 26 F. T. C. 666; In the Matter of -Master Lock Co., (1938)
27 F. T. C. 982; cf. In the Matter of American Optical Co., (1939) 28
F. T. C. 169; In the Matter of Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., (1939) 28
F. T. C. 186; In the Matter of Simmons Co., (1939) 29 F. T. C. 727 (re-
tailer with several outlets each of which ordered and received separate
deliveries with consequent increase in cost).
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orders, but aggregating a smaller total volume than that of the
former over a year's time. A belief that such cumulative dis-
counts represent savings to the seller when the facts are otherwise
does not make such discount any the less discriminatory. A price
difference based upon the size of individual purchases and ship-
ments is sound and understandable. A cumulative discount-
one given at the end of a period of time-is justifiable then only
where savings have been achieved by the seller on individual
orders of the particular buyer, and have not been reflected in the
price then paid. The savings in the form of a discount can then
be reserved and refunded at the end of a period of time. Hence
the true cumulative or volume discount is outlawed because not
supported by cost savings. Only a cumulative-quantity discount
remains.
The commission is correct in its view that no savings result
to a seller to justify giving one buyer a better price simply because
at the end of a period of time it is discovered he has purchased
more than another buyer. But, on the other hand, if the seller
is certain in advance that such buyer will purchase within a defi-
nite period a larger volume than other buyers, though individual
orders are smaller, this knowledge may well enable such a seller
to effectuate cost savings on these orders. This situation existed
in the Goodyear Case, where no such defense was found, not,
however, because such cost savings would not be recognized, but
because they were not satisfactorily proved. The contract in
In the Matter of H. C. Brill Company,78 contained no promise
by the buyer to purchase a definite amount over a fixed period,
although the certainty based on past experience, that such buyer
would in fact buy a large amount over such period, might well
enable the seller to save as much in costs of manufacture, sale,
and delivery, as if such a promise really existed.7 Yet proof of
whether such certainty exists is a difficult administrative problem
and the line may be drawn between the actual existence and non-
existence of a promise. Such a contract could then be considered
as only one sale with delivery in indefinite quantities as requested
over a certain period of time. Then any demonstrable cost sav-
ings on the whole order should justify the price differential
involved.
78(1938) 26 F. T. C. 666.
79Cf. Gardner, An Inquiry Into the Principles of the Law of Contracts,(1932) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8. The promise may be one of form only. Thus
in the Brill Case the contract read :--"The purchaser has obligated itself to
buy from the manufacturer a large quantity of merchandise." Cf. In the
Matter of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., (1938) 26 F. T. C. 486.
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Besides savings in cost, based upon quantity ordered, different
methods of delivery may result in cost savings. Thus in In the
Mattcr of Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation"0 a five per cent dis-
count was denied buyers of package cheese and cheese products
unable or unwilling to handle by single purchase $5.00 worth
in two or three weeks. Any retailer could so qualify, because
respondent exchanged new goods for deteriorated products in the
retailer's stock. To maintain freshness respondent ran a truck
delivery system directly to retailers. Quantities sufficient to
make this distribution system economically possible were encour-
aged by such discounts. Smaller orders required higher delivery
costs. The commission therefore found such differentials justified
by differences in the cost of delivery based upon differing quan-
tities. A price discount, greater when one hundred fifty pounds
and over of loaf cheese were ordered, was found similarly justified
in cost savings, because as to them delivery was direct from the
warehouse at a smaller cost than that of purchases of less than
one hundred fifty pounds, delivered by the same truck distribution
service maintained for package cheese. Although it would have
been improper accounting to allocate to loaf cheese the same per-
centage of distribution costs as was attributed to the package
cheese products, to take care of the charges of this more expensive
delivery service, because the loaf cheese did not ncessitate such
a frequent and expensive distribution system, yet any reasonable
allocation still left a cost difference between the orders above and
below the one hundred fifty pound limit large enough to justify
the distinction in discounts granted. Since accurate allocation of
delivery costs was particularly impossible, the commission was
willing to indulge in reasonable inferences in favor of justification
of the price differential.
Often one method of cost accounting may result in a cost
savings justification for the price discount, while another may
not, and yet each accounting method as applied to the situation
involved may of itself be not unreasonable. Which one is the
commission to choose? A customary system already in use by
respondent and not devised for the occasion should have a strong
presumption in its favor. Accountants differing as to which
method more accurately portrays costs, the commission should
allow the discount, if any one of these reasonable cost account-
ing methods can justify it by demonstrating cost savings within
the limits of the proviso.
80(1937) 25 F. T. C. 537.
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The delivery system of respondent in the Kraft Case suggests
a possible means of evading the statute in connection with the
cost savings proviso. Respondent-seller might have raised costs
above what were required in sales to the unfavored buyers by
going through unnecessary processes in connection with such
orders. Thus the cheese manufacturer here might have delivered
all loaf cheese directly from warehouses, instead of distributing
certain lots directly to retailers by the more expensive truck
system. The one hundred fifty pound limit between different
delivery methods might have been lowered or raised in accordance
with respondent's desires to favor larger or smaller orders. In
this case, however, any cost manipulation would have been pre-
vented by a more careful allocation of the delivery costs between
loaf and packaged cheese products.81 Ordinarily a seller's desire
to make profits would prevent him from unnecessarily adding to
costs on smaller orders, even to favor larger ones. Further-
more, the commission has indicated that only the costs of "essen-
tial" functions will be allowed,82 again with a reasonable latitude
as to what is "essential."
The commission, in considering whether cost savings justify
a given price differential, will sustain the defense based upon
any cost accounting system offered by respondent that is reason-
able, even if developed only for the occasion. But such a method
must not be based too much on guess work and non sequiturs.
In In the Matter of Standard Brands, Incorporated,3 respondent
developed an elaborate cost accounting system to justify, by cost
81Cf. In the Matter of Hollywood Hat Co., (1937) 25 F. T. C. 555
(costs of labor graduated in accordance with price range classification).
Here selling price variations did not depend on cost, but cost variations in
wages were made to depend on price differences; thus any price could bejustified by such cost differences.82In the Matter of Standard Brands, Incorporated, (1939) 29 F. T. C.
121. The commission's accountants corroborate the cost accounting evi-
dence presented by respondent. Cf. In the Matter of Bird & Son, (1937)
25 F. T. C. 548. The cost proviso justification seems to have been allowed
only when distinctive methods of sale or delivery existed, arising from the
quantity bought or the nature of the buyer. Compare Kraft and Bird Cases
with Standard Brands Case.
s3(1939) 29 F. T. C. 121. The studies on which direct costs were based
and allocated were found here not to be dependable. For example, solicita-
tion costs on the basis of number of calls did not consider length of time
of each call and included promotional costs, which should have been sepa-
rately treated. Service costs were charged to all customers whether services
were availed of or not. Comment, Cost Accounting Defenses Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, (1940). 35 Ill. L. Rev. 60; cf. Cies, Costing Prob-
lems Posed by the Robinson-Patman Act, (1939) 17 Harv. Bus. Rev. 350.
Furthermore the varying discounts were not uniformly given to each
respective customer.
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savings in selling and delivery, the discounts there found on the
sales of bakers' yeast. The commission rejected the whole account-
ing system. Here monthly averages of total sales and costs for
a period of three months operation were calculated. A percentage
of such total costs was allocated to bakers' yeast by applying
a predetermined percentage to dollar sales. Direct costs were
then estimated and allocated to the various discount brackets by
a period survey, and were further subtracted from the total costs,
derived by the predetermined percentage method, to find indirect
costs. In addition, the commission could not see in what way
many items of such indirect costs could within reason have been
incurred in connection with sales of bakers' yeast. The inaccuracy
of these ratios used to allocate costs to the separate discount
classifications was demonstrated when the commission found that,
as to one such item of indirect cost-for stockroom-no cost
differences between orders of cartons and less-than-carton
amounts could exist in the sale of bakers' yeast. Although the
allocation of costs to each product may not have been accurate,
the allocation between the various discount brackets seems to have
been more important in demonstrating cost savings.8 4 But the
inaccuracy of both was demonstrated.
CUSTOMIER SELECTION
"And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise
84A three cents per dozen difference between purchases of foil yeast
over and under 300 pieces per month was at first found not to have sub-
stantially lessened competition, but later this finding was reversed and
further, such difference was found not justified by the cost savings proviso.
But a change to a cent and one-half difference was held so justified.
Usually the commission has allowed the defense of savings in cost
when different methods of manufacture, sale, or delivery clearly stood out.
In the Matter of Bird & Son, (1937) 25 F. T. C. 548; Letter of W. A.
Ayres, supra note 6, Nos. 3 (carload lots); 4 (retailer-wholesaler) ; 12
(carload lots) ; 16 (materials, styling, and selling); 24 (hundred dollar
lots) ; 26 (chain store performs service manufacturer otherwise would have
to do for self) ; 50 ($.013 per carton difference justified by varying costs
in selling and handling). See generally the difficulties of cost accounting
under the Act. Smith, The Patman Act in Practice, (1937) 35 Mich. L.
Rev. 705, 714-21; Burns, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation of
Price Competition, (1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 301, 314; Hamilton,
Cost as a Standard for Price, (1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 321; McNair,
Marketing Functions and Costs and the Robinson-Patman Act, (1937) 4
Law & Contemp. Prob. 334, 345 (cost accounting should be based on
functional, not quantity approach, costs going where functions are per-
formed). This test traces discounts to buyer's, not seller's costs. Para-
doxically the commission has ordered cost savings to be passed on and even
price discounts to be granted. In the Matter of United Fence Manu-
facturers Ass'n, (1938) 27 F. T. C. 377; cf. In the Matter of Anheuser-
Busch, Docket No. 3798 (F.T.C. September 25, 1940) (discounts not justi-
fied by delivery cost differences).
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in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide
transactions and not in restraint of trade :"
This clause was mentioned, but not passed on, in Show's v.
Wilson-Jones Co.,85  where plaintiff was attempting to base a
cause of action under sec. 2 (a) of the Act upon a mere refusal
to quote prices or sell to him, whereby he lost a certain contract
for which he otherwise would have bid successfully. This situa-
tion seems to be an exercise of the defendant-seller's right of
customer selection. And yet the words--"in bona fide trans-
actions"-indicate a restriction on such defense. Thus in In the
Matter of Bird & Son, 6 where respondent was undergoing a
change of sales policy, shifting from sales to both retailers and
jobbers to sales to jobbers only, the commission found a situation
of bona fide customer selection, which was not a combination in
restraint of trade, but was to reduce the seller-respondent's cost
of distribution, a valid reason for such selection. Thus individual
traders have the right of customer selection in the absence of any
such combination.
Another limitation on the right of a seller to select his cus-
tomers may exist in the expanded definition of "purchasers" to
include customers of a buyer when the seller has some measure
of control over the resale. When such a seller is merely exercis-
ing his right to select his customers and thereby sells only to
wholesalers, he may still find that retailers buying from such
wholesalers have become "purchasers" from him within sec.
2 (a), and that he has become responsible as a price discriminator
for price terms involved in the resales to such retailers5 7
CHANGING CONDITIONS
"And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent changes from time to time when in response to changing
conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the
goods concerned, such as but not limited to actual or imminent
deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods,
distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in dis-
continuance of business in the goods concerned."
85105 F. (2d) 331 (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939).
86(1937) 25 F. T. C. 548; Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, No. 40
(careful customer selection in tobacco business, not in collusion, based
upon number of customers already, credit risk, and general business methods
of prospective buyers).8 71n the Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., (1937) 25 F. T. C.
1228; cf. Arthur v. Kraft-Phenbi Cheese Corp., (D. Md. 1938) 26 F. Supp.
824 (under Clayton Act) ; Abouaf v. J. D. & A. B. Spreckels Co., (N.D.
Cal. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 830 (Robinson-Patman Act).
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This proviso is intended to preserve the right of a seller to
dispose of the goods with normal and economically justifiable
freedom of action, where the maintenance of the price is no longer
in his control., The Act does not compel price rigidity. An
attempt to do so would probably fail. Although the use of this
proviso should be carefully watched so that it is not used as a
cloak for real price discrimination, the commission so far has
been liberal in allowing this justification as a defense.89
BURDEN OF PROOF
"(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint
under this section, that there has been discrimination in price
or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the
prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon
the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless
justification shall be affirmatively shown, the commission is
authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination."
baPatman, The Robinson-Patman Act (1938) 147-8. This proviso
did not appear in the Clayton Act and, if wisely administered, should pre-
vent the dangers of price rigidity and unduly high prices. See Burling and
Sheldon, Price Competition as Affected by the Robinson-Patman Act,
(1939) 1 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 31.
5OLetter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, Nos. 33 (favored buyer had
taken advantage of notice of price increase to stock up) ; 48 (buyer made
large purchase on advantageous market several months before). The
commission has adverted to this changing condition proviso, though not
found to be a defense. In the Matter of Agricultural Laboratories, (1938)
26 F. T. C. 296 and companion cases. See Gordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-
Discrimination Act-The Meaning of Sections 1 and 3, (1936) 22
A. B. A. J. 593, 597 (this proviso as one justification for price differences
on current deliveries based upon price changes after long term contract
with future deliveries entered into) ; Evans, Anti-Price Discrimination Act
of 1936, (1937) 23 Va. L. Rev. 140, 161-3; cf. In the Matter of Christmas
Club, (1937) 25 F. T. C. 1116. Section 2 (a) also contains a procedural
provision designed to permit the Federal Trade Commission to fix the
maximum quantity of any order when otherwise so few buyers of the com-
modity involved would be able to buy in the greater amounts required to
receive the benefit of a low price, even though based on cost savings, that
competition would be injured. The section reads: "Provided, however, That
the Federal Trade Commission may, after due investigation and hearing
to all interested parties, fix and establish quantity limits, and revise the
same as it finds necessary, as to particular commodities or classes of com-
modities, where it finds that available purchasers in greater quantities are
so few as to render differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory
or promotive of monopoly in any line of commerce; and the foregoing shall
then not be construed to permit differentials based on differences in quanti-
ties greater than those so fixed and established." The cost defense proviso
is a justification for a price discrimination, even where there is a harmful
effect on competition, because of the policy of rewarding efficiency, yet when
only a few buyers are so efficient as to be entitled to the benefit of such cost
savings, the injury to competition outweighs the policy of rewarding such
efficiency. The commission under this proviso then merely decides when
the interest of preserving competition has outweighed that policy and fixes
the largest unit that can receive a lower price.
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By its words this procedural provision, placing upon the one
charged with a violation of the Act the burden of affirmatively
showing justification, applies only to complaints issued by the
Federal Trade Commission. Hence private litigants, seeking an
injunction, triple damages or both, or the Department of Justice,
do not have the benefit of this procedural provision. Further-
more (b) does not seem to apply to complaints under any sub-
sections of the Act except (a) or (e).9 1 In so far as the charge
is against a buyer, it might also include (d). But to the commis-
sion the greatest advantage of this burden of proof shift arises in
(a), where all of the justification provisos exist."2
9OThe indication in Alabama Independent Service Station Ass'n v.
Shell Petroleum Corp., (N.D. Ala. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 386 was that the
plaintiff, seeking to enjoin and recover damages for a violation of sec. 2 (a),
has the full burden of proof even to disproving justifications. It was there
found sufficiently to have been alleged that price differentials were not
warranted by the "only due allowance" proviso of the statute. The com-
plaint charged "an unjustified price differential." Contra: Gibson Canning
Co. v. American Can Co., (E.D. Ill. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 242 (under Clayton
Act). With this burden plaintiffs will need all the aid possible accorded
to them under the new Federal Rules of procedure to make out a complete
cause of action. See the difficulties of the plaintiff in C. F. Simonin's Sons
v. American Can Co., (E.D. Pa. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 784, (E.D. Pa. 1939)
24 F. Supp. 765, (E.D. Pa. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 420, (E.D. Pa. 1939) 30 F.
Supp. 901.
9 1In so far as "price" includes indirect price discrimination, and in so
far as subsections (c), (d), and (e) describe indirect price discrimination,
(b) might be said to apply to all these subsections. But the addition of
"services or facilities furnished" seems to exclude this interpretation. See
In the Matter of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., (1938) 26 F. T. C.
486, 509 ((b) includes proceedings under (a), (d) and (e)), aff'd,
(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 667, cert. denied, (1940) 308 U. S. 625,
60 Sup. Ct. 380, 84 L. Ed. 521, petition rehearing denied, (1940) 309 U. S.
667, 60 Sup. Ct. 466, 84 L. Ed. 1035 ((b) includes (a) and (e) only);
(1939) 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 189. But "any hearing on a complaint, under this
section" (italics supplied) seems to refer to all of sec. 2.
92A difference of opinion exists as to whether (b) requires the com-
mission to show an injurious effect on competition before the respondent is
required to rebut the commission's case by showing justification. See
Watts, The Robinson-Patman Act (1936) 3 (facts of justification suffici-
ently in knowledge of respondent to put burden of proof on him, due process
not thereby being violated). This view is opposed to Gaskill's. A price
discrimination without any injury caused thereby to competition does not
make out a prima-facie case. Justification is in the nature of a confession and
avoidance, and indicates more clearly only those defenses included under
the provisos of sec. 2 (a), of which the effect on competition is not one.
The other construction would seem to raise constitutional doubts as to the
validity of (b). An extremely narrow construction would apply sub-
section (b) only to the defense of meeting competition contained therein.
Even under the Clayton Act, in private litigation the defendant had the full
burden of proof as to justifications. American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning
Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 763, cert. denied, (1931) 282 U. S.
899, 51 Sup. Ct 183, 75 L. Ed. 792; (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 867. Further-
more "burden of rebutting the prima-facie case" seems to indicate a mere
shift of going forward with the evidence, but "unless justification shall be
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Although the effect of this provision is dear, the commission
has applied it differently in various instances. The case of In the
Matter of Shefford Cheese Company" arose after answer on a
motion to dismiss the complaint. The commission founded its
decision partly on the complaint, and partly on a supplemental
investigation of facts. It held that no facts unearthed in the in-
vestigation controverted the allegation in respondent's answer
that the differing discounts were made to meet those of competitors
or the services or facilities they furnished. Thus respondent
proved this defense by mere allegation, and the commission felt
itself obligated to disprove it. Had the complaint gone to actual
hearing, subsection (b) would probably have been applied against
respondent.9-
affirmatively shown, the commission is authorized to issue an order terminat-
ing the discrimination :" seems to shift the burden of persuasion or proof
itself.03(1937) 25 F. T. C. 1209.
0
4See (1939) Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission 7. In
the informal part of the proceedings the commission itself investigates pos-
sible justifications, such as cost savings. But upon formal complaint the
burden of proof rests upon respondent. Compare In the Matter of Agri-
cultural Laboratories, (1938) 26 F. T. C. 296 with Letter of W. A.
Ayres, supra note 6, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12, 16, 21, 24, 27, 33, 40, 43, 45,
48, 50. In the Matter of the Williams and Wilkins Co., (1939) 29 F. T. C.
678, shows how (b) expedites the commission's procedure. In In the Matter
of American Optical Co., (1939) 28 F. T. C. 169 cost justification in savings
in sale and delivery based upon sizes of individual orders was assumed. The
commission has not proceeded with a hearing on a complaint when the
practices charged to violate the Act have stopped, even though continued
after its passage. In the Matter of Bird & Son, (1937) 25 F. T. C. 548(lasted only four months); American Safety Razor Corp., (1937) 24
F. T. C. 1388 (advertising and promotional service discounts practice
abandoned when Robinson-Patman Act was passed-not likely to be
resumed-case closed without prejudice); Procon Grocery Service Co.,
(1937) 24 F. T. C. 1402 (buyers' brokerage corporation dissolved) ; Quality
Bakers of America, (1939) 29 F. T. C. 1328; In the Matter of Piel Brothers
Starch Co., Docket No. 3799 (F.T.C. Dec. 15, 1939) (voluntary liquida-
tion of respondent charged with price discrimination); Letter of W. A.
Ayres, supra note 6, Nos. 3, 11, 13, 17, 18, 27, 44, 49, 52, 55, 64. Cases
have been closed for other reasons. Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6,
Nos. 2 (seller charged was being sued for triple damages under Act in-
volving same issues): 16 (not sufficient indications of illegality of price
discrimination to justify time and money to proceed further) ; 40 (prior
recent general investigation of tobacco industry) ; 46 (identical complaints
under investigation by Department of Justice) ; 61 (selling plan involved
prevalent in industry then being investigated).
All the remedies accorded under the Clayton Act of private treble
damage and injunction suits still exist. Treble damage suits under the new
act have been brought. Shaw's v. Wilson-Jones Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir.
1939) 105 F. (2d) 331; Alabama Independent Service Station Ass'n v.
Shell Petroleum Corp., (N.D. Ala. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 386 (injunction
Sought too) ; Frederick W. Huber v. Pillsbury Flour Mills Co., (S.D.
N.Y. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 108; C. F. Simonin's Sons v. American Can Co.,
(E.D. Pa. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 901. Although the usual plaintiff is the
purchaser discriminated against, the seller forced to accord a price discrimi-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
MEETING COMPETITION
Subsection (b) further reads:
"Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall pre-
vent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing
that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to
any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities
furnished by a competitor."
This provision 95 is similar to the one appearing in the Clayton
Act, but because of a feeling that such a proviso offered too
many loop holes, this type of justification was placed in the
amendments in a procedural subsection. Fear has been expressed
whether meeting competition will remain an absolute defense to a
charge of price discrimination. But if such evidence rebuts a
prima-facie case, it is difficult to see why it cannot be called an
absolute defense. At least the commission's cease and desist order
cannot stand, if no prima-facie case exists. That is the same thing
in effect. 951
nation, it would seem, has a cause of action against the inducing favored
buyer. Port v. Girdler, (N.Y. Co. Sup. Ct. Nov. 10, 1939) 1 P. H. Trade
Serv. (2d ed.) par. 40,529 (price discrimination per se does not show loss
on sale involved); Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1934) 71 F. (2d) 768, cert. denied, (1934) 293 U. S. 590, 55 Sup. Ct. 104, 79
L. Ed. 684 (seller has suit against other seller discriminating in price) ;
Louisiana Farmers' Protective Union v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., (E.D. Ark. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 483 (producer of commodity, which
buyer resells at discriminatory prices, as plaintiff). The new act has been
involved also indirectly in private litigation. Progress Corporation v.
Green, (1937) 163 Misc. Rep. 828, 298 N. Y. S. 154 (in suit for price
of goods sold that defendant buyer was discriminated against in violation
of Robinson-Patman Act is no defense, remedies therein provided being
exclusive), (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 192; Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Birnam-
wood Oil Co., (E.D. Wis. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 314. But cf. F. W. Stock &
Sons v. Jacobson, (1939) 173 Misc. Rep. 621, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 200 (de-
fendant can assert violation of Robinson-Patman Act as defense to suit
on brokerage-fee-splitting contract) ; Jacobson v. F. W. Stock & Sons,
(S.D. N.Y. 1940) 1 F. R. D. 138; Kurtin v. Brookes, (N.Y. Co. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 26, 1940) 1 Fed. Trade Serv. (2d ed.) par. 40,543 (cause of action
against directors stated for waste of corporate assets by needless price dis-
crimination under Act, practice as good business and resulting in future
profits being defense only).
95(1936) 80 Cong. Reg. 9415 puts a further limitation upon this
proviso-that respondent can meet only a non-discriminatory price of his
competitor. Such a distinction does not appear in the statutory wording,
seems impractical from a business standpoint, and would raise constitutional
doubts. In the Matter of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., (1936) 22
F. T. C. 232 under the Clayton Act indicated at p. 331 the contrary view.
Another constitutional issue is raised if this defense is not allowed in
triple damage and injunction suits, but only in hearings before the commis-
sion, as the proviso in subsection (b) would seem to indicate.
-aConstitutional doubts may indicate such an interpretation. Cf. Fair-
mont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, (1927) 274 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 506, 71
L. Ed. 893, 52 A. L. R. 163.
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In the Goodyear Case, 6 although evidence existed to prove
that the third contract between Sears and Goodyear, with its
secret stock and cash bonuses and its discriminatory price, was
exacted from Goodyear by implications that Sears might "do
better elsewhere," the commission concluded that the price dis-
crimination there involved was not made in good faith to meet
competition, because respondent's apprehension, if any, that com-
petitors were offering or about to offer Sears a similarly low
price for an equal quantity of tires of similar quality was not
based on sufficient evidence. That submission to such terms is
the only way to secure the particular buyer's business is not a
defense. Otherwise the statute would be nullified. The commis-
sion further indicated that the price discrimination must be
granted in order to meet competition-i.e., with knowledge that
a lower price has already been offered by a competitor-and
must be no more than enough to meet such competition. Thus
good faith is part of respondent's case, and the defense cannot
be an afterthought. The secrecy involved in the Goodyear Case
would seem to preclude such good faith.
The justification of meeting competition has been likened to
that of self-defense in torts and criminal law. The need for
such action must be substantial, imminent, and employed as a
last resort. A real rival must actually have appeared, and have
cut his price below that of the seller-respondent. To defend him-
self such seller may then do no more than to match such lower
price to the buyer or buyers in question. To give a greater price
discrimination would only invite retaliation, and no limit would
ever be reached. As in the defense of self-defense, the situation
cannot be one of respondent-seller's own making, but one in
which he finds himself.
7
16(1936) 22 F. T. C. 232.
117Cf. In the Matter of Standard Brands, Inc., (1939) 29 F. T. C. 121;
Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, Nos. 5 (discrimination stopped when
similar competitive practices stopped), 7 (same), 10, 11, 21, 27, 43, 48.
The problem of comparison is more difficult when a lower price is used
to match better services or facilities of a competitor. In the Matter of
Shefford Cheese Co., (1937) 25 F. T. C. 1209 (such defense proved only by
allegation when commission had no controverting evidence). A uniform
delivered price system may be justified by this proviso. A seller favors
by absorbing transportation costs the more distant buyer to meet competition
of another seller located nearer that buyer. The same may be said of
situations arising under the multiple basing point system. In the Matter
of Albert L. Whiting, (1938) 26 F. T. C. 312, represented a situation where
one dealer bought at 20c (10c lower than other competing dealers), but
claimed as justification that the reason was to meet competition of farm
bureaus, which bought at 17c. But in so far as that dealer's 40c retail
price was higher than those of the bureaus, this defense does not seem
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BROKERAGE
The only subdivision of section 2 to have been considered in
the courts is that one concerning brokerage, which reads:-
"(c) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or
to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage,
or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu
thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale
or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other
party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other
intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for
or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any
party to such transaction other than the person by whom such
compensation is so granted or paid."
The first case to result in a cease and desist order under this
subsection was In the Matter of Biddle Purchasing Company. 8
Respondent-Biddle Company ran a market information and pur-
chasing service for its subscribers, who were wholesalers of
several lines of commodities. A monthly fee was paid by each
subscriber for the market information, and on every order to
purchase placed with Biddle by a subscriber Biddle collected from
the seller with whom the order was placed a brokerage fee-the
usual one paid by sellers to their brokers. To the knowledge of
the seller in every case this brokerage fee was credited against
the monthly subscription fee to the particular buyer. In fourteen
per cent of the cases these brokerage fees thus credited resulted
in an excess due such buyer, which excess was paid over to him
in cash. The commission concluded that these practices enabled
buyers through Biddle to receive lower prices than those not so
purchasing. This fact was more evident because buyers charged
such brokerage fees received not against their subscription dues,
but to reduce the cost of goods bought. Biddle was a buyer's
agent, not a seller's. The services of Biddle's purchasing staff in
examining and testing wares of sellers, manufacturers, and pro-
ducers were classed as incidental to the purchasing services Biddle
rendered its subscribers, and, if of any value to sellers, were
donated to them. Furthermore, they were not selling services.
bona fide. In the Matter of American Optical Co., (1939) 28 F. T. C. 169,
permitted discounts to meet competition, presumably that of the Bausch and
Lomb Company. See In the Matter of Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., (1939)
28 F. T. C. 186. The latter company was accorded the same privilege.
98(1937) 25 F. T. C. 564, Note, (1938) 6 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 203,
(1939) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 319 (sec. (c) in general). See also Oppenheim,
Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act,
(1940) 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 511; Note, (1940) 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 736.
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The seller could not be paying Biddle for services rendered, be-
cause their payments to Biddle were passed on to the particular
ordering buyer. The commission also concluded that buyers
rendered no services to sellers. It is arguable, however, that the
monthly fee which buyers paid Biddle covered the cost of examin-
ing and testing seller's wares to make them marketable, and to
this extent buyers rendered services to sellers. The answer
seems, however, to be that whether these activities of Biddle
were of value to the sellers, they were not rendered for those
sellers under any contract with them to find purchasers, but for
the buyers under a contract to find suitable sources of supply, and
were performed to enable Biddle to fill orders when placed with it.
The sellers did not contract for these services of testing and
examining. The fees paid by them were not in return for such
services, but for finding a buyer.
The commission, in ordering the sellers to cease and desist
from paying brokerage fees, stressed the knowledge of such sellers
that the fees were in fact either being turned over to the particular
ordering buyer or used for his benefit. But such knowledge
does not seem to be an essential element of sec. 2 (c). Nor does
this provision require that the seller's payment be passed on by
the agent to the buyer-principal. But, if Biddle retained the
brokerage fees, no price favoritism would be accorded buyers.
Competition only with other brokers would be injured and,
brokers being engaged only in rendering services, the Act does
not cover their activities as such. Although sec. 2 (c) makes
unnecessary the finding of injury to any line of competition, such
dispensation seems sustainable only by reason of the fact that
such a practice of payment of brokerage for no services rendered
would in the normal case injure competition between buyers, and
is so outside the average competitive practices as to be deemed
illegal in itself. Congress may be justified in presuming that in
the great majority of cases brokerage fees, paid to the buyer's
broker, ultimately benefit the buyer himself, so that a few cases
where this does not occur can still be included within the general
proscription. 0
The circuit court of appeals sustained the commission's
views."," Although subdivisions (c) (d) and (e) of the Act
DOIn the Matter of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., (1938) 26
F. T. C. 486.
lOOBiddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 2d
Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 687, cert. denied, (1938) 305 U. S. 634, 59 Sup. Ct.
101; (1938) 24 Iowa L. Rev. 179; Note, (1939) 7 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 910;
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contain more specific congressional language on what may be an
indirect price discrimination, yet since (c) requires no finding
as to a harmful effect of the practices there prohibited on com-
petition, the court refused to read such a requirement taken from
(a) into (c), and further held that such construction did not
render the provision violative of due process.
What Congress contemplated in section 2 (c) was the end of
the practice of large buyers forcing a seller to grant an indirect
and secret price discrimination by means of a brokerage payment
to a buyer-controlled "broker." Here competition with other
buyers is clearly injured. But in the Biddle Case nothing indi-
cated that not all buyers, big and small, could subscribe for Biddle
services. All subscribers were as free to buy as much as they
wanted through Biddle. But here again mere size of the buyer,
manifested by his larger number of orders, resulted in his receiv-
ing a proportionately greater amount of free marketing service
and ultimately a cash discount. Although payment of brokerage
fees to buyers to get them to use Biddle's purchasing service,
which in turn would make sellers more cooperative in giving
marketing information because of the orders resulting therefrom,
may have been an excellent reason why Biddle passed on such
brokerage fees, yet, if that be a justification, every price discrimi-
nation direct or indirect may be justified as necessary to get or
retain the buyer's business.
The circuit court of appeals for the fourth circuit passed on
the same question in Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission.'
As to the selling services rendered the court recognized that Oliver
obviated the necessity of sellers using and compensating inde-
(1939) 27 Geo. L. J. 384. (Petition for enforcement of decree of C.C.A. 2d
Cir. filed August 15, 1940). Judge Swan's dissent found that the sellers' pay-
ments were for services rendered by the broker, but in so far as buyers re-
ceived cash rebates on their purchases when brokerage credits exceeded
subscription dues, these payments were illegal. This is a distinction be-
tween cash rebates and marketing information service. But to the extent
that both were of value to the buyer an illegal discrimination in his favor re-
sults. The majority stressed the secrecy of the brokerage payments as justify-
ing Congress in calling the making of such payments an unfair trade prac-
tice. See McLaughlin, Legal Precedents as Criteria, (1939) 11 Boston
Conference on Distribution 89.
'Olin the Matter of Oliver Brothers, (1937) 26 F. T. C. 200 (identical
facts as Biddle case), aff'd, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 763; (1939)
24 Wash. U. L. Q. 607. See (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1207, 1212 (passing
on of costs, if saved, should be permissible). Although subsection (c)
was directed at the chains, the court indicated that size or lack of size
of the buyers involved was irrelevant. The court for the purposes of argu-
ment treated the broker as a sellers' agent, but said that whether or not
such an agent was also a buyer's broker, he could not split with the buyer
his commissions, earned for selling services.
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pendent selling brokers. To this extent services were rendered
to them, but since Oliver had to perform such services anyway
by finding a seller under his contract with buyers, such services
were rendered in reality only to buyers and not to sellers, benefit
to whom then was only incidental.
But one further step was taken in the Oliver Case beyond the
Biddle Case, in suggesting a proper interpretation of the am-
biguous "excepting" clause. For compensation to a buyer for
services rendered by him or his agent to come within the "except-
ing" clause of sec. 2 (c), such services must be such as the seller
is bound to render in connection with the sale, not such as are
performed by the buyer in connection with the purchase, or such
as are rendered to him by his agent to enable him to purchase.
Thus a seller ordinarily has the obligation to find buyers, it being
a part of the cost of goods sold. But, if the buyers have em-
ployed an agent to find a seller, the seller's duty is removed. The
conclusion then seems to follow that payment of compensation
would be authorized to one who shoulders the seller's obligation,
which the latter otherwise would be obliged to perform and pay
for himself. Btit payment of such compensation is exactly what
the statute prohibits.
In In the Matter of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Com-
pany'0 2 respondent buyer, from its different buying offices and
warehouses scattered over the country, maintained field buying
agents who purchased grocery products for respondent and col-
lected brokerage fees from sellers. In the course of so doing,
these agents exchanged with sellers information affecting market
conditions, and advised how to improve quality and concerning
the size of containers, manner of packing, traffic information, and
routing of commodities. These agents even relieved sellers of
surplus and bought when sellers were financially embarrassed, but
then only when it was not contrary to the buying interests of
respondent. The defense-that the sellers could under the ex-
ception clause pay those agents for such services rendered-was
properly rejected. The agents represented only the buyer. All
'102(1938) 26 F. T. C. 486 (although claiming it unessential, the com-
mission found substantial injury to competition, both in sellers' and buyers'
lines) ; aff'd (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 667, cert. denied, 308 U. S.
625, 60 Sup. Ct. 380, 84 L. Ed. 521 (1940), rehearing denied (1940) 309
U. S. 694, 60 Sup. Ct. 466, 84 L. Ed. 1035; (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1303;
47 Yale L. J. 1207; (1939) 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 189, (1940) 28 Geo. L. J.
548. The Court rejected the idea that the cost proviso of (a) was applicable
to (c). Services rendered to sellers were not selling services. Yet costs
of only brokerage services were intended to be passed on.
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of the aid they gave sellers was solely in the interests of
respondent-buyer in performance of their duty as buying agents.
To allow this defense would make it difficult to prevent any seller
from paying a buyer compensation based upon the theory that the
buyer is rendering that seller a service by coming to him rather
than to a competitor. Although the "depression" has probably
caused in every seller's heart a feeling of gratitude toward an
approaching buyer, to allow this gratitude to be expressed in
monetary terms under the "services rendered" clause would
effectively nullify subsection (c).
After the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act respondent
changed its system of receiving a direct brokerage fee to one of
discounts from current prices and cumulative discounts, equalling
those former brokerage fees, except for the omission of fractions.
Discounts were thus given regardless of the quantities in indi-
vidual orders. The commission, perceiving that these methods
were only other ways of passing on brokerage to the respondent-
buyer, rejected the distinction attempted to be drawn and thus
demonstrated more clearly that brokerage is really another form
of price discrimination. The court of appeals likewise recognized
the distinction as merely an attempt to avoid the Robinson-Patman
Act.
The commission indicated that the true reason for the con-
troversial exception clause was not to relax as to some customers
the prohibition that a seller cannot pay brokerage to a buyer or
his agent, but to make it certain that a seller could pay brokerage
to his own broker for selling services when that broker rendered
to a buyer incidental accommodating "services," similar to the
kind which respondent-buyer's brokers had in this case been
rendering to sellers. Thus in the reverse situation the exception
would validate payment by buyers to their own brokers for buy-
ing services, notwithstanding the latter's incidental accommodating
"services" rendered the seller.
A new issue was raised, but not answered in In the Matter of
the Webb Crawford Company.103  There partners composing a
brokerage firm, Daniel Brokerage Company, also owned the stock
in respondent-a wholesale grocery company. Daniel represented
sellers in sales to buyers, other than the wholesale buyer-
respondent. But when convenient, respondent bought through
Daniel, which also collected brokerage fees on such purchases from
103(1938) 27 F. T. C. 1099.
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sellers, in all amounting to about 75 to 85 per cent of its total
income, although respondent bought only ten per cent of its
supplies through Daniel. The commission treated the Daniel
Company as representing only the buyer and not the seller on
such sales. Hence any services rendered by Daniel to the seller
were only incidental. The sellers' payment of brokerage to Daniel
on such sales, in accord with the prior cases, clearly violated sec-
tion 2 (c). By ignoring the corporate fiction the commission
concluded that the buyer itself received the benefit of brokerage
fees paid on its own purchases. When the same men bought in
one capacity and then in another capacity received brokerage on
such purchases, to preserve the corporate fiction, even had Daniel
been incorporated, would have nullified the statute.
The fifth circuit court of appeals affirmed,104 but held un-
justified the conclusion that the buyer controlled the broker.
Instead it found that the broker controlled the buyer. The dis-
tinction is meaningless, since, no matter how expressed, the buyer
was the broker. Furthermore, the court reversed the commis-
sion's conclusion that on Webb Crawford's orders Daniel was only
a buyer's broker. The court held that even here Daniel remained
a seller's broker, but, because the brokerage partners were also
representatives of the buyer-respondent, the sellers' payments of
brokerage to the partners were payments to representatives of the
buyer, and as such fell within the exact terms of sec. 2 (c). This
holding leads to the inference that, had Daniel been incorporated,
payments would not have been made to the buyer representatives,
but to a separate legal entity-Daniel, Inc., not the buyer's broker,
but the seller's, the corporate fiction thus defeating the statute.
The court's holding rendered unnecessary passing on respondent's
contention that the buyer's unexercised power of control over the
brokers did not come within the terms "subject to the direct or
indirect control."'0 5 , But this distinction, if upheld, would destroy
the statute.
104Webb-Crawford Company v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A.
5th Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 268, cert. denied, (1940) 310 U. S. 638, 60
Sup. Ct. 1080, 84 L. Ed. 1406 (exception for services rendered does not
qualify prohibition). The court by change of commas tied up the exception-
for-services-rendered clause with the prior words of subsection (c) and cut
it loose from the limitation that said services be in connection with the
selling and buying of commodities. This interpretation broadens the
clause. But cf. In the Matter of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,(1938) 26 F. T. C. 486 (no services rendered seller in connection with sale
or purchase).
'05Brief for Appellants, pp. 25-31, Webb-Crawford Company v. Federal
Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 268.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In the three preceding cases decided under subsection (c) the
broker was found to have passed on the brokerage fees received.
Here Daniel, the court held, did not. The statute makes this fact
immaterial. But Daniel was in reality the buyer. Another dis-
tinction lies in the fact that the broker here was an independent
bona fide seller's broker at all times according to the court; except
on sales to respondent-buyer, according to the commission. Which
of these two conclusions, that of the court or of the commission, is
correct seems to depend on a careful factual analysis. The com-
mission found that Daniel had "connections with only a small
proportion of the sellers from whom purchases are made by the
buyer respondent." If "purchases" here means those made
through the broker, then Daniel, searching for a new seller, was a
buyer's broker as to these transactions. If "purchases" included
those made independently of Daniel, then on purchases through
Daniel, the latter merely sold for one of its regular seller-clients
to the respondent-buyer. The proportion in Daniel's business of
sales to respondent and those to outside buyers, as well as the pro-
portion of respondent's purchases through Daniel to all other pur-
chases independently made would help to decide this issue. A
bona fide, independent seller's broker occasionally can sell to him-
self and still collect a commission, but, if he does so often, he seems
to be a buyer rather than a broker. Perhaps the commission
intends to prevent this practice because of the difficulty of draw-
ing a line between a true, independent broker and a buyer's broker
or the buyer himself.0 6
106The exception for services rendered was applied in Letter of W. A.
Ayres, supra note 6, Nos. 45 (English manufacturer paid brokerage to
exclusive sales agent in United States) ; 53 (seller's agent found no longer
to be interested in buyer). Other violations of subsection (c) have been:
In the Matter of Quality Bakers of America, (1939) 28 F. T. C. 1507, modi-
fied, (1939) 29 F. T. C. 1328 (benefits to buyers in reductions of association
dues and manufacturing and merchandising advice), aff'd, (C.C.A. 1st Cir.
1940) 114 F. (2d) 393 (immaterial that buyers receive brokerage in form
other than cash). In the Matter of Reeves Parvin & Co., (1939) 28 F. T. C.
1429 (broker and wholesaler corporations owned by same men; wholesaler
recommending sellers to brokers and brokers to sellers, netting broker 95 per
cent of its business) ; In the Matter of C. R. Anthony Co., (1939) 29 F. T. C.
922 (sellers' lack of knowledge that brokerage payments reach buyer im-
material) ; In the Matter of Jake Felt, Docket No. 3765 (F.T.C. Dec. 22,
1939) (individual operating two businesses); In the Matter of Charles v.
Herron, Docket No. 3916 (F.T.C. Jan. 27, 1940) (6c allowance in lieu of
brokerage, denial as matter of law buyer can render seller services); In
the Matter of Mississippi Sales Co., Docket No. 3511 (F.T.C. May 15,
1940) ; In the Matter of San Pedro Fish Exchange, Docket No. 3739
(F.T.C. July 13, 1940). In the Matter of Atlantic Commission Co., Docket
No. 3344 (F.T.C. July 24, 1940); In the Matter of Parker T. Frey Co.,
Docket No. 4290 (F.T.C. Oct. 8, 1940) (broker in resale business) ; In the
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The new issue, suggested by the interpretation that Daniel
was a seller's broker, is whether a true intermediary, acting as
agent for both sides, can under subsection (c) still legally be
compensated by both sides, especially by the seller. Such an
agent, while he is subject to buyer control, is not subject to control
by one "other than" the seller, for he is the seller's agent too.
This interpretation reads "exclusive" into the statute. The court
seemed to recognize the status of such a true intermediary. To
the extent that such intermediary retains his commissions, re-
ceived from both sides, competition in neither the buyer's nor
seller's line is injured. It is submitted that such practice falls
neither within the words nor the spirit of section 2 (C).17
ADVERTISING ALLOWANCES
"(d) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce to pay or contract for the payment of any thing of
value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in the
course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for
any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer
in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for
sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered
for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is
available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers
competing in the distribution of such products or commodities."
Subdivision (d) is a recognition that under some circum-
stances the buyer can render services of value to the seller. In
In the Matter of Golf Ball Manufacturers' Association,'0 5 two-
Matter of Parr Sales Co., Docket No. 4233 (F.T.C. Nov. 2, 1940). See
George, Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: The First Year, (1937)
4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 392, 404 (cooperative headquarters insist they do
real cooperative service in persuading members to buy from sellers and
securing repeat business). Similar cases under the Packers and Stockyard
Acts were: Trunz Pork Stores v. Wallace, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1934) 70 F. (2d)
688; Wilmington Provision Co. v. Wallace, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1934) 72 F.
(2d) 989 (same situation; since seller charged buyer brokerage fee he paid
buyer's broker, no price advantage to buyer) ; see Note, (1940) 26 Va. L.
Rev. 494, 503.0 7Contrast the dicta in Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission,
(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 763, 770, with that in Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939)
106 F. (2d) 667, 674 and Quality Bakers of America v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 393, 399.
708(1938) 26 F. T. C. 824 (percentage of advertising allowance passed
on to individual retailer called violation of sec. 2 (a), but part retained by
association and used for benefit of all members called violation of sec. 2 (d)).
See Thorp and George, Check Lists of Possible Effects of the Robinson-
Patinan Act (1936) in Dun & Bradstreet Monthly Review 14 (advertising
allowance contracts separate from sales). The tie-up with a sale seems
necessary to bring such practices within the jurisdiction of Congress-
Interstate Commerce--and required by the statutory wording.
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thirds of the retailers of golf balls were professional golfers asso-
dated together in the P.G.A., (Professional Golfers' Association).
As an association they were under contract with manufacturers
and wholesalers of golf balls to print on such balls the name,
"P.G.A.," in return for compensation. The P.G.A. was not the
buyer, but furnished the services, the joint prestige of all the pro-
fessional golfer-members giving advertising value to the trade
mark. To this extent the services could be said to be "furnished
through such customer" buyers. The seller's payments
therefor were "for the benefit of a customer" in that half was
paid directly to the buying retailer, and the rest was used in
advertising and promotional work, generally for the benefit of
all retail-members. Retailers, non-members of the P.G.A., re-
ceived no benefits from such payments either directly or indirectly.
In entering a cease and desist order against this practice the com-
mission did not pass on the most difficult words in the subsection,
"available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers
competing. . . ." To allow as a defense merely a gesture by a
seller of willingness to permit other buyers to render similar
services and to be similarly compensated when no other buyer has
the size, prestige, and ability to render such services, as has the
buyer so favored, would nullify the statute. Here no other re-
tailers could possibly have been of any value to the sellers by
lending their collective name for advertising purposes. Or such
value would have been so slight, as compared to that of the P.G.A.
name, that compensation therefor would not have made up for
the discriminatory effects of the compensation to the P.G.A.
Similarly in In the Matter of United States Rubber Coin-
pany'-0 respondent-manufacturer gave to oil companies, retailing
through their various service station outlets, as favorable dis-
counts as those given wholesalers in return for the former exercis-
ing their influence and giving merchandising assistance in such
retail selling of respondent's tires. What are "proportionally
equal terms" was not considered, because respondent made no
offer of these "over-riding commissions" to other buyers in return
109(1939) 28 F. T. C. 1489; In the Matter of Curtice Brothers Co.,
Docket No. 3381 (F.T.C. April 15, 1940); In the Matter of Lambert
Pharmacal Co., Docket No. 3749 (F.T.C. Aug. 12, 1940). Letters of W. A.
Ayres, supra note 6, Nos. 18 (monthly advertising allowance contract can-
celled) ; 25, 26 (chain store soliciting manufacturer to share expenses of list-
ing latter's product for each store manager held no price discrimination, but
payment for services rendered, though no evidence existed that seller made
like payments available to other customers). Since the case was decided
under subsection (a) the costs savings proviso was utilized.
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for pushing retail sales. If the favored buyers were the only
ones in a position to make such services of any value, the discrimi-
nation would then again be merely by reason of size and economic
marketing power of mass buyers, which kind of advantage the
Act is designed to prevent. Yet in both cases-this and the
P.G.A. case--the payments were for bona fide advertising and
sales promotional services, unlike the situation where the drug
wholesaler induced discounts on its purchases from sellers for
worthless advertising from such sellers in its trade or house
magazine."10 If payments for true services rendered were in-
tended to be proscribed, a constitutional issue might be raised,
for a seller should not be required to offer all other competing
buyers, less able to perform the advertising services required, a
chance to do so, just because such seller wishes to advertise with
one of them, more able. But since even an offer to other buyers
of the opportunity to earn some compensation when in a position
to be of some advertising and promotional value to the sellers
was not present in either case, neither can be criticized. While
"available" does not require the actual granting of promotional
allowances to other competing customers, how much less than
that is legal is uncertain. But actual granting does seem to be
required when such customers do offer to furnish "the similar and
same services and facilities.""'
FURNISHING OF SERVICES OR FACILITIES
"(e) That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate
in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers
of a commodity bought for resale, with or without processing, by
contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the
8 1In the Matter of Miami Wholesale Drug Corp., (1939) 28 F. T. C.485.
"'In the Matter of Lambert Pharmacal Co., Docket No. 3749 (F.T.C.
August 12, 1940). Who is to be the judge of whether one buyer is as able
as another to render "the similar and same services and facilities?" In this
case the commission found that buyers, offering less exclusive services and
facilities than those furnished by the buyers highest paid therefor by re-
spondent-seller, claimed an ability and willingness to provide such more
exclusive services and facilities. Their requests for the higher compensation
therefor respondent refused. A wide discretion in this matter should be
given the seller's judgment, although the commission seems to be the final
arbiter.
Much speculation has gone around as to what "proportionally equal
terms" means. To the business man that a seller must advertise every-
where to advertise anywhere, or at least make such an offer to advertise
everywhere, is preposterous. See Phillips, The Robinson-Patman Anti-
Price Discrimination Law and the Chain Store, (1936) 15 Harv. Bus. Rev.
62, 74-75; Gell, Further Aspects of the Robinson-Patman Anti-Price Dis-
crimination Act, (1937) 2 Law Society Journal 856.
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furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the process-
ing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so
purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on pro-
portionally equal terms.' 1 2
This is the reverse of subsection (d) and has been construed
in In the Matter of Luxor, Ltd.,"3 holding that the furnishing to
only some of the respondent-manufacturer's customers of a smaller
sized package of cosmetics, found to be more salable than the
larger size, constituted 'a service or facility supplied in connection
with the handling, sale or offering for sale of such commodities.'
It is arguable that in so far as some of the kinds of cosmetics
were inseparable from their containers, the two sizes were not
'of like grade and quality' and that the seller was only exercising
its privilege of customer selection. But assuming 'like grade and
quality,' customer selection likewise applies to quantity, a valid
reason existing for such selection.l1sa Here, however, no such rea-
son appeared. The commission may have been somewhat influenced
by the fact that the larger size offered no quantity discount and
that the smaller size, sold only to the large mass distributors, was
denied to the small ones. Furthermore not to declare the furnish-
ing of a more salable package a service within the meaning of
sec. 2 (e) would render the drawing of a line difficult and con-
fusing and would result in circumvention of the act.
Selling to some buyers at delivered prices and not to others
might also be considered as a "furnishing of .. . services .. .
connected with the . . .handling . . . of such commodity so pur-
chased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally
equal terms.""11
4
ll2No requirement here exists that either the seller or buyer be engaged
in commerce, or that the discrimination be made in the course of commerce
nor do the "purchasers" to whom the services or facilities are rendered
need to be competing. Since subsection (e) describes a situation analogous
to the one involved in subsection (d), the same requirements will likewise
probably be imposed on (e). Thus in In the Matter of Luxor, Ltd., Docket
No. 3736 (F.T.C. July 31, 1940) the commission found the purchasers there
involved to be competing. The use of the word "discriminate" in (e)
and not in (d) will probably have no significance. The same is true of the
word "purcbaser" in (e) instead of "customer" as used in (d), except that
"purchaser" is here limited to one "for resale."
"'3Docket No. 3736 (F.T.C. July 31, 1939).
lllaSee note 42, supra.
"1In the Matter of Agricultural Laboratories, (1938) 26 F. T. C. 296.
The same may be said of the uniform delivered price where some buyers
receive goods at a much reduced transportation cost, while others pay more
than the real cost of transportation. The same may also be said of the
basing-point system, if transportation costs from the manufacturing point
are considered the real cost and compared with those from the basing point.
The services by the yeast manufacturer to customer-bakers in the form
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BUYER'S LIABILITY
"(f) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or
receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this
section."
In almost every instance whether a violation of sec. 2 (a),
(c), (d), or (e) is charged the situation involved is one where
the buyer because of size or circumstances has been able to force
the seller to accord him terms more favorable than those granted
to other buyers. For this reason subsection (f) is an important
amendment to the Clayton Act. In so far as this kind of a buyer
is equally liable with the sellers, he may be dissuaded from induc-
ing or accepting such discriminatory favors, Further, sellers may
be better enabled to withstand such inducements. The words "a
discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section," in
so far as subsections (c), (d), and (e) are merely specific ex-
amples of indirect price discrimination, would prevent the buyer
from coercing the seller into indulging in any of the practices
proscribed in sec. 2. This interpretation is strengthened by the
use of the word "section."",'
of sales promotions were evidently not found discriminatory in In the
Matter of Standard Brands, Incorporated, (1939) 29 F. T. C. 121. In the
Matter of Nutrene Candy Company, Docket No. 3756 (F.T.C. December 19,
1939) involved the furnishing by the seller of a candy lottery to some pur-
chasers. Since such lottery was really offered to all buyers and the only
reason why some did not receive it was because of their own moral scruples,
the rendering of such a service to some purchasers only would not be a
violation of sec. 2 (e).
1rIn the Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, (1937) 25
F. T. C. 1228; In the Matter of Golf Ball Manufacturers' Ass'n, (1938) 26
F. T. C. 824 (f includes d) ; In the M4atter of Miami Wholesale Drug Corp.,
(1939) 28 F. T. C. 485 (same) ; In the fatter of American Oil Co., (1939)
29 F. T. C. 857; cf. Letter of W. A. Ayres, supra note 6, Nos. 25, 26 (al-
though on the part of the seller the practices described involved violation
of subsection (d), charges were brought against buyer under subsection
(a)). Subsection (c) itself prevents the buyer from accepting the broker-
age payments therein proscribed. If the case fails against the seller, it
equally fails against the buyer. In the Matter of Bird & Son, (1937) 25
F. T. C. 548.
The Robinson-Patman Act has a provision providing for criminal
penalties. Section 3. "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any
transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which discriminates to his knowledge
against competitors of the purchaser, in that, any discount, rebate, allowance,
or advertising service charge is granted to the purchaser over and above any
discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge available at the
time of such transaction to said competitors in respect of a sale of goods of
like grade, quality, and quantity; to sell, or contract to sell, goods in any
part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted by said person
elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying competition.
or eliminating a competitor in such part of the United States; or, to sell,
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"Section (4). Nothing in this Act shall prevent a cooper-
ative association from returning to its members, producers, or
consumers the whole, or any part of the net earnings or surplus
resulting from its trading operations, in proportion to their pur-
chases or sales from, to, or through the association." 1 6
When income, accruing to a corporation-purchasing com-
pany, composed of stockholder-members, who were also banded
together to form an unincorporated association, was derived
from brokerage payments and selling commissions paid by sellers
on such members' purchases made through the corporation and
in addition was applied one-half to the association dues of such
stockholder-members in proportion to their individual and re-
spective purchases and the other half generally for services ren-
dered to all of such members, the commission found such cor-
poration not to be a cooperative association within the meaning
of sec. 4 .117 Its members were not producers or consumers, but
or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of
destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.
"Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall, upon
conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both." This is the Borah-Van Nuys Amendment to the
Act. See (1936) 80 Cong. Reg. 6346 (small merchant can have violator
prosecuted without going to Washington). The wording of sec. 3 was taken
from 25 and 26 Geo. V, ch. 46 sec. 9 (Can. 1935). Cf. Attorney-General
for British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada, [19371 A. C. 368,
affirming, [1936] Can. S. C. R. 363.
ilOItalics supplied. Section 4 is to protect producer and consumer co-
operatives against any charges under the Act based upon their distribution
upon a patronage basis of earnings and surplus among their members.
H. R. Rep. No. 2951, (1936) 74th Cong. 2d Sess. 9. See Jaffe, Some Com-
ments on the Price Discrimination Act, (1936) 10 U. Cin. L. Rev. 402,
418 n. 28. Zorn and Feldman, Business Under the New Price Laws (1937)
69 (cooperatives as buyer cannot receive brokerage, nor different treat-
ment from any other buyer); Lazo, Commercial Cooperatives Under the
Patman Law in Werne, Business and the Robinson-Patman Law (1938)
142; cf. Procon Grocery Service Co., (1937) 24 F. T. C. 1402. This
activity is purely internal as distinguished from those activities which the
Act proscribes. An amendment to the act was passed, "That nothing in the
act approved June 19, 1936 (Public, 692, Seventy-fourth Congress, second
session), known as the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, shall
apply to purchases of their supplies for their own use by schools, colleges,
universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions
not operated for profit." (1938) 52 Stat. at L. 446; 15 U. S. C. sec. 13(c)
(Supp. 1939). In so far as these institutions purchase commodities for their
own use, competition with nobody is injured. Hence the amendment seems
purely precautionary. See Senate Bill 2383 to make Robinson-Patman Act
inapplicable to purchases of supplies by State welfare agencies.
117In the Matter of Quality Bakers of America, (1939) 28 F. T. C.
1507, modified, 29 F. T. C. 1328. The lack of a comma between "con-
sumers" and "the whole" indicates that "producers, or consumers" does
not limit the word "members." The comma before "or" substantiates this
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retailers. On appeal the United States circuit court of appeals,
first circuit, passing over the question whether either or both of
the organizations involved were cooperatives within the meaning
of the Act, held that sec. 4 neither authorized cooperative as-
sociations to engage in those practices forbidden by sec. 2 (c)
nor excepted them from its provisions. n s
CONCLUSION
Even before the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act the
commission manifested a significant indication as to the pur-
pose and scope of anti-price discrimination legislation319 The
theory of granting a lower discriminatory price is that that
buyer's profit has been increased by exactly the amount of the
reduction in price granted, putting his competitor to a disadvan-
tage in an amount equal to that sum. Any price variation is to
be open, not secret, so that all buyers can purchase at a like
price and on similar terms. Construed as a whole, the words-
"where the effect . . . may be substantially to lessen com-
petition" must be interpreted to indicate generally the distinc-
tion between fair and unfair competition. The law is designed
to prevent the lessening of competition by unfair acts. As long
as fair methods are followed, competitive conditions will prevail,
while unfair methods always tend toward monopoly. By what
standard does the commission decide whether a given price prac-
tice is a fair or an unfair act? There is no other standard ex-
cept that of its effect on competition itself. Every price policy
of any producer or distributor would seem to have some effect,
though often remote and unsubstantial, tending to restrict or
lessen competition. The essence of the competitive system is
to overcome and thus to impair competition of others. Unfair
methods are not found independently of their effect on competi-
tion and then labeled "unfair" and "abnormal," because they will
substantially lessen competition or cause a monopoly. But their
effect on competition is discovered first. If harmful, they are
then labeled "unfair."
Change in our economic system is inevitable. Congress can-
not effectively legislate against it. But Congress, through the
view. Hence "members" should include retailers and wholesalers; i.e., dis-
tributors, even though a definition to include them was struck in the earlier
stages of the bill.liSQuality Bakers of America v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A.
1st Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 393.1
'-In the Matter of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., (1936) 22
F. T. C. 232.
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commission, can prevent too rapid a change from causing un-
necessary hardships and suffering to those forced to readjust
to the new ways. Congress and the commission can prevent in-
dividual units of the economic system from causing this too
swift change by indulging in new and unusual practices, not sanc-
tioned by the old distribution methods, and hence looked upon as
improper. Business, desiring for its own security to prevent the
dislocations of too rapid progress, has viewed certain practices
generally as beyond the range of its legitimate activity because
they promote too much aggrandisement on the part of those en-
gaged in them and receiving their benefit. Congress has specifi-
cally described and prohibited them without regard to their ef-
fect on competition. The harmful effect can be presumed. But
often practices promoting too rapid change occur in the form of
the more usual price and sales policies, which are ordinarily con-
sidered legitimate. Most price variations are necessary, even
beneficial to the distribution system and to consumers-they are
the results of progress and change for the better. But some
promote too accelerated a change in the competitive struggle.
They are thus legal or illegal, depending upon their influence
in promoting these too abrupt variations. To this extent the
Robinson-Patman Act, with its application by the commission
and by private litigation, steers a middle course between freezing
the status quo, on the one hand, and, on the other, permitting to
go unchecked the rapid alterations in our economic system with
their consequential human dislocations. 120
12OLearned and Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman Law: Some Assumptions
and Expectations, (1937) 15 Harv. Bus. Rev. 137. The emphasis of the
new Act seems at first sight somewhat paradoxical. The broad aim is to
promote competition, to prevent the growth of monopoly in the field of dis-
tribution; yet when certain individual competitors are injured in the com-
petitive struggle, the act comes to their rescue. But the Act draws the line
between ceasing protection of these individual competitors from the necessity
of competing in order to keep competition alive, and throttling competition
to protect such individual competitors in order to keep their competitive
capacity alive. For a general review of the cases in the Federal Trade
Commission under sec. 2 (a) through 1939 see-Sawyer, The Commission's
Administration of Paragraph 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act: An Ap-
praisal, (1940) 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 469. See also Copeland, The Problem
of Administering the Robinson-Patman Act, (1937) 15 Harv. Bus. Rev. 156.
